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®n March 16th, 1968, Philip 131aiberg, the then world lone heart
transplant survivor left the Croote Schuur Hospital in Cape Town,
South Africa . He was accompanied to the entrance of the hospital
by Dr. Christiaan Barnard, who headed the transplant team that
gave the fifty-three year old dentist the hears of Clive Haupt, a
twenty-four year old coloured man who died of brain damage after
collapsing on a beach.'
For centuries man had been searching for a way to transplant
body organs or parts from a healthy animal or individual into an-
other animal or person whose organs or parts had been destroyed
or damaged by disease or injury .
*J.-G . Castel, S.J .D ., of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
1 The operation on Dr. Blaiberg was the third of its kind. The first heart
transplant operation took place in South Africa, on December 3rd, 1967
and involved Mr . L. Washkansky. The patient survived eighteen days . On
December 6th, 1967, Dr . I{antrowicz of New York performed a similar
operation on a baby. The operation was unsuccessful . Since that time almost
thirty heart transplant operations have been performed in several countries
of the world with varying degrees of success .
At a meeting of the Council for International Organizations of Medical
Sciences, held in Geneva in June 1968, which was devoted to heart trans-
plants and attended by twenty-four of the world's most prominent heart
surgeons, it was said that "heart transplants at the moment are, a form of
palliative (temporarily or superficially relieving) of an exceptional charac-
ter, the results of which are not yet determined" .
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It is only since World War Two that attempts to transplant
skin, bone, corneas, kidneys and more recently hearts, have proven
successful . Actually, surgical questions concerning transplantation
were solved around 1950, and the internal medicine problems
around 1956 . Compatibility questions, however, are just beginning
to be sorted out in the major medical centres of the world.
Today, as the successful Cape Town operation indicates, the
technical difficulties involved in transplants have to some extent
been overcome and considerable progress has been made towards
solving the immunological problems .
The first organ transplantation was performed in Boston in
1954, when a healthy kidney from one identical twin was suc-
cessfully transplanted into the other twin who was dying of kidney
failure. Since that time, more than two thousand kidney transplants
have been given to patients around the world with a large number
of recipients surviving with functioning kidneys for up to three
years.
The recent dramatic developments in heart transplantation in
South Africa, in the United States of America, France, England
and Canada indicate that other vital organs also may be success
fully transplanted . Attempts have already been made to transplant
the liver which involves a more difficult operation because its
functions are more complex than those performed by the heart,
which, after all, is principally a pump and consists of tissues from
a germinal source . Some day, it may be possible to transplant
someone's reproductive organs, or brain?
Human organ transplantation poses difficult technical, ethical,
moral and legal problems which concern not only practising doc-
tors but also lawyers, moralists, sociologists and the community
at large. The Nuremberg trial has clearly demonstrated the dangers
involved when experiments are performed on healthy human sub-
jects. "Science has made us Gods before we are even worthy of
being men."'
On the question of transplants, the law has not greatly co-
operated with the medical profession . It has not kept pace with
scientific advancement in this field of medicine . Court decisions
are rare and of little assistance, as common law and statute law
contain a great number of obsolete rules especially with respect
to dead bodies, the prime source of transplants . Even recent legis-
z See the Toronto Daily Star, March 26th, 1968, p. 53 . Note that the
first lung transplant took place in 1963 in the United States of America.
3 J . Rostand, Pensées d'un biologiste (1939) .
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lation on human tissue and organs designed to overcome some of
the obstacles found in the common law is far from comprehensive.
In many instances medical progress is still held back by present
legal constraints. Rigid and over conceptualized legal thinking
must be adapted to novel conditions . 3a
Human transplants bring many moral and ethical problems to
mind . For instance, is it right for the hope of patients for survival
to be based on the expectation of death of others? Is it ethical for
a surgical team to await the death of one patient to save another?
Is it right to remove an organ from a healthy live donor when the
recipient's prolongation of life after treatment is 'limited to one,
two or three years? Will the transplant do any good? More gener-
ally, is the right to experiment a fundamental freedom for the
physician? What are its limitations? How should the recipients be
selected when there is a shortage of donors and equipment? ®n
what basis should such a choice be made? For instance, should an
infant of tender years or an unskilled individual's life be prolonged?
Who is qualified and has the right to adjudicate the value of some-
one else's years?' To what extent is a surgeon in aposition to choose
between the risk incurred by the donor of the transplant and the
value of the life of the recipient?
31 However, see Burger, Reflections on Law and Experimental Medicine
(1968), 15 U.C.L.A . L. Rev. 436: "The complaint of some is that our
standards of ethics and rules of law do not keep pace, with scientific de-
velopments and the potentials of experimental medicine, and thus do not
give experimental programs a free rein. This is probably correct . Law and
ethical standards are not subjects of research and discovery ; they are the
fruits of slow evolutionary processes. The law does not search out as do
science and medicine ; it reacts to social needs and demands. Law is not an
end in itself-it is a tool, a means. Tools are not ordinarily made to
hammer out solutions to hypothetical problems but for real problems,
which means that the problem must arise, .exist, and be recognized before
the law reacts to provide a solution . Here is where science and law differ.
We cannot, therefore, compare rates of development in such dissimilar areas
as science and medicine with law and ethics ."
'In the case of a transplant from a live donor, the problem of selection
is unlikely to arise as the recipient must find his own donor. With respect
to transplants from cadavers, the choice is usually determined by medical
criteria and the recipient's availability at the time of the donor's death.
When there are several available and compatible recipients, it would seem
that the selection, of one of them should not be made by ad hoc com-
parative judgments of social worth.
For the process of selection in the case of hemodialysis and kidney
transplantation, see Sanders and Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal
Lag: Homodialysis and Kidney Transplantation (1968), 15 U.C.L.A . L.
Rev. 357, at p. 366 et seq., and p. 393 et seq.
At a recent meeting of heart surgeons convened in Geneva by the
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, it was unani-
mously decided that the choice of a heart donor must-be guided by the
following considerations :
"l . His heart must be in perfect condition at the time of removal.
348
	
THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW [VOL . XLVI
To attempt to solve these moral and ethical problems uniformly
is almost impossible as the answers would depend primarily upon
a person's religious views, his attitude to the sanctity of the human
body and his respect for the individual. 4a
I. Medical Aspects of Transplantation.
It is difficult to appreciate the ethical, moral and legal aspects of
human organ transplantation without some knowledge of its tech-
nical aspects as, historically, significant advances in medicine have
resulted in many dogmatic declarations by men not fully acquainted
with the technical aspects involved . For instance in 1796, when
Jenner first attempted small pox vaccination, the great philosopher
I. Kant stated that such an experiment had lowered mankind to
the level of animals . Animality, he said is being inoculated to man.
Every time that the loss or failure of a vital organ of a patient
endangers his life and such loss or failure cannot be compensated
for either by some other organ assuming an additional load as in
the case of kidneys, or by a mechanical appliance or an artificial
organ, modern medicine has recourse to homotransplantss How-
ever, the major limitations of this new technique is the shortage
of supply.' Of course, eventually, the best way to overcome this
shortage of supply is to solve the immunological' barrier to hetero-
transplantation or to make available artificial organs that are
permanently built into a patient.
l . General.
Transplants are generally divided into the following categories :
2. An immunological examination of the compatibility of donor and
receiver must precede the transplant .
3 . The examination of the donor must reveal a state of complete and
irreversible abolishment of the brain's functions."
"Note that at the time of writing (April 1968), in England, a Com-
mittee of medical, legal and religious leaders appointed by the Minister of
Health to study the ethical. legal and moral issues involved in transplant
operations had not yet made its report .
'In general, see Woodruff, M.F.A., The Transplantation of Tissues and
Organs (1960) ; Starzl, T.E ., Marchiora, T.L . et al., Transplantation (1964) ;
Murray, J.E ., Gleason, R., Bartholomay, A., Transplantation (1965) .
'No one knows precisely how many people die each year who might
be saved by kidney transplants . In the United States of America estimates
range all the way from 6,000 to 20,000 . No more than 450 patients re-
ceive kidney transplants annually .
' A new serum made of antilymphocyte globulins and injected into the
recipient reduces the chances of transplant rejection . Lymphocytes (small
white corpuscles) belonging to the intended recipient are injected into an
animal (horse or ewe) . As a result, the animal produces an anti-serum
from which the globulins are extracted.
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autotransplants, isotransplants, homotransplants and heterotrans-
plants.
E4. Autotransplants are pieces of tissue (or possibly organs) trans-
planted from one part of the patient's body to another. Autotrans-
plantation can be used only where the patient is able to with-
stand the loss of tissue from one part of his body to be grafted to
another.
. Psotransplants are pieces of tissue or organs transplanted from
one identical twin to another.
Unless technical problems develop, autotransplants and iso-
transplants are almost always successful as the rejection reaction is
non-existent . In the case of identical twins the donor and the reci-
pient are histocompatible.
C. Homotransplants are pieces of tissue or organs from one person
to be transplanted to another (or in animal experiments, trans-
plants from one animal to another of the same species) .
Ordinarily such transplants may survive for a few days or
weeks before they are destroyed as a result of an immunological
reaction of the body which regards the transplanted tissues or
organs as foreign. However, when_ the tissue transplanted is avascu-
lar (or structural) as for instance in the case of the cornea or
blood vessels, the transplant will generally be successful . Other-
wise, in order to be successful, the recipient's reaction to the trans-
plant must be abolished or weakened by some immunosuppressive
therapeutic procedure.
D. Heterotransplants are transplants from an animal to man or
from an animal of one species to a recipient of another species.
So far such transplants have not been successful as they are quickly
rejected by the recipient's body.'
Homotransplants are usually classified in the following cate-
gories
i) Pieces of tissue or organs given voluntarily by living donors .
For obvious reasons, such donations are limited by the nature of
the tissue or organ. It is not possible to give one's liver or heart and
survive whereas this is not so in the case of a kidney . In general,
kidney transplants from live donors do not present a danger to
them if they are in good health, as a person can live as well
with one kidney as with two. The risk for the donor is 0.12% and
s It was reported in March 1968 that University of Miami investigators
may be on the right track in search of a way to transplant animal kidneys
into people . Graft rejection is closely connected with a mysterious sub-
stance called complement .
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is estimated by insurance companies to be identical to a ten
mile car trip per work day. However, there always is an operative
risk that the healthy donor might suffer some injury .
ii) Pieces of tissue or organs removed in the course of ordinary
surgical operations . In practice, it is very rare that such material
can be used by another patient.
iii) Pieces of tissue or organs removed from dead bodies . In
this case, obviously, there is no risk to the donor. Dead bodies
are the only source of transplants for organs such as the heart or
liver. The success of the transplantation depends upon the type
of tissue or organ involved and the speed with which it is re-
moved after the death of the donor. Some organs must be removed
before they have been irreparably damaged by lack of blood
circulation. It is also possible that the deceased's organs are dis-
eased and thus unsuitable for transplantation.
Skin, bones, blood vessels and corneas, can be removed or
transplanted many hours after death and have a low incidence of
rejection reaction. On the other hand, kidneys and the liver
deteriorate rapidly and must be transplanted soon after cessation
of circulation in order to survive and function.
If the kidneys can be removed and perfused in less than one
hour after cessation of circulation in the donor, the chances for
survival are good!
The heart may survive at least two hours without changes
due to a complete lack of blood circulation.
2. Death.
Medically, it is very important to define the moment of death
so that removal of tissue or organs, when legally permissible, can
take place as soon as possible . In other words, what is the earliest
time at which a transplant may be removed?
Advances in resuscitation and techniques for bypassing the
heart and reducing the body's oxygen require a revision of present
ideas on the diagnosis of death. In some instances a patient's
respiration and heartbeat may be maintained by artificial means
9 Kidneys begin to deteriorate immediately after circulation has stopped
and will not "keep" more than about four hours. Recently Dr . P. O. Belzer
of the University of California disclosed that he has devised a kidney pre-
server which he hopes will keep kidneys in good condition for as long as
three days thus giving the surgeons time to do the necessary tissue matching
and to select the recipient who is most likely to accept the donor's kidney
without rejection. Dr . Belzer is planning to modify the machine so that it
can preserve hearts (Time Magazine, March 22nd, 1968, Canada Edition,
p. 53) .
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for a long period of time . A heartbeat can also be restored by
external or internal massage, by the use of an electrical pace-
maker, or by electric defribillation.
It is possible for a person in a state of artificial survival to
"die" while some of his organs continue to be irrigated by machines
for some time afterwards. Conversely, a person is not necessarily
dead because his heart has ceased to beat .
The question that arises is whether a vital organ can be re-
moved from a person who still has a heartbeat and a circulation
and who according to ordinary standards is alive although he is a
"living cadaver" because irreversible destruction of brain matter
with no possibility of regaining consciousness has taken place.
The traditional tests of death may be stated in this way : "the
apparent extinction of life, as manifested by the absence of heart-
beat and respiration" ." Approaches of this kind were formulated
at a time before certain body functions could be artificially pro-
longed . They served well the society they were designed to control.
Now the context has changed. The need for review of traditional
tests of death has been given additional emphasis by the develop-
ment of sophisticated homotransplantation techniques .
Two basic questions seem to be involved in the case of a
patient whose "life" is artificially maintained by mechanical de-
vices, as for instance a respirator or an electric pace-maker, al
though he has had irreversible destruction of brain matter and is
not salvageable. The patient has no hope of ever regaining con-
sciousness and if the respirator or pace-maker is stopped, his heart
and circulation will also stop within a few minutes. As mentioned
earlier the first question is whether it is legally and ethically possi-
ble to remove a vital organ while the heart is still beating or before
the respirator is turned off. There is an additional issue as to
whether and at what stage, without incurring the danger of a
possible charge of homicide, a physician may turn off the respir-
ator and wait for the heartbeat to stop so that the patient is dead
according to the conventional definition of death and it is permissi-
ble to remove the organ in question .
Discontinuation of extraordinary measures to keep a patient
alive may perhaps be morally justifiable but under the classical
definition of death an irreversibly unconscious person whose life
depends on a machine is still alive and until "death" occurs
it is forbidden to interfere with his body .
The conclusion that a person is dead,-who has been kept
11 Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary (24th ed., 1965) .
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alive by artificial means-should be based on proof of the exist-
ence of irreversible lesions inconsistent with survival, especially
the destructive and irreversible character of changes in the central
nervous system considered as a whole."
In the case of a person in a vegetative state, it has been said
by experts in the field that it is possible to establish death by the
use of an electroencephalograph and a variety of other physio
logical measurements other than the absence of a heartbeat and
cessation of respiration .
When the chances of recovery of consciousness have been
totally eliminated, brain death has occurred, although everyone
agrees that lack of function of the mind alone is insufficient
evidence of death. The physician must be sure that the brain is
so damaged that consciousness cannot be regained .
Some physiologists accept one minute of electroencephalo-
graph silence as uncontrovertible proof of death, others three or
five minutes .
This test is not sufficient, as there should be no error in the
diagnosis of death, especially in transplantation operations, as the
donor must be protected against a surgeon exercising too much
haste in removing vital organs in circumstances where medical
resuscitation is still possible . The prospective donor's fundamental
right to live must be respected. Also, the surgeon is entitled to
be guided by rules that will protect his freedom and foster progress
in the science of transplantation.
To sum up, the classical signs of death must be re-examined by
the medical and legal professions and brought up to date for pur-
poses of transplantation."
Death, however, does not lend itself to a purely legal defini-
tion . It is essentially a technical professional medical problem. The
law must allow physicians to decide the moment of death on the
basis of medical evidence . What is needed is, a medical definition
of death that would have legal force." In other words, medicine
and the law must agree to define death upon well established
medical principles . In this respect the physiologist must play a
leading role.
11 In most countries the present medical tests of death are: the absence
of heartbeat and respiration, dilated pupils (mydriasis) and the total, lack
of reflexes .
12 E.D.R .S., G.L .B.T., The Moment of Death (1963), 31 Medico-Legal
J. 195. Bi6rck, When is Death? [1968] Wis L. Rev. 484.
"In France for instance, until recently, the Code Napoldon (art. 77)
stated that the officer of civil status had to ascertain the death of a person .
Since March 28th, 1960, this ascertainment is made by a physician. Twenty-
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Although death is primarily a medical question, the law should
nevertheless devise certain procedures designed to protect the
patient's life against the danger of a hasty diagnosis . For instance,
the death certificate of a patient kept "alive" by artificial means
should be issued only after consultation with at least three physi-
cians . If a transplant is envisaged, the team performing the opera-
tion should not be involved in the ascertainment of the death of
the donor . It should only proceed after a decision has been reached
as to death and the machines have been turned off by the attend-
ing physician upon the advice of two other physicians including at
least one or two specialists . The members of the transplant team
naturally interested in saving their patient should not be placed
four hours must elapse between the time of death and the interment or an
autopsy . (Note that in the case of autopsies, a law of February 7th, 1924
required death to be established by the absence of heartbeat and respira-
tion .) This delay makes it difficult to perform transplant operations . On
October 20th, 1947, however, a government decree declared that, in a re-
stricted number of hospitals "si le médecin-chef de service juge qu'un intérêt
scientifique ou thérapeutique le commande, l'autopsie et les prélèvements
pourront, même en l'absence d'autorisation de la famille, être pratiqués
sans délai" . (See also government directive of January 27th, 1955.) Two
of the hospital's physicians must ascertain the death of the donor by appli-
cation of traditional tests . These tests which were to be found in govern-
ment directives (e .g . February 3rd, 1948, September 19th, 1958 . An early
diagnosis of death could be established, independently of, or in addition to,
direct examination, by several exploratory methods) have now been
changed . On April 27th, 1968 an official definition of death was adopted
by the Council of Ministers upon recommendation of the French Academy
of Medicine . The absence of heartbeat, blood circulation and of respira-
tion are no longer to be considered as signs of death. The clinical signs
of death are now the total absence of cerebral activity evidenced by several
flat electroencephalograms as well as a complete lack of reflexes for a
sufficient period of time .
Note that on December 15th, 1967, Mr . Gerbaud had introduced a
bill (No. 621) in the French National Assembly which purported to define
clinical death and to allow the removal of organs for transplanting pur-
poses.
In England a group appointed by the British Medical Association to
define the point of death is still searching for an answer (April 1968) .
A conference called by the Minister of Health which met on March 6th
concluded that "no attempt should be made to lay down a legal definition
of death or rules which doctors should observe" Hansard, House of Com-
mons, March 25th, 1968, col . 217 . However, the Minister's conference
recommended that to allay public disquiet vital organs should not be re-
moved from a donor "until spontaneous vital functions had ceased" .
It has been suggested that a patient's "death" whose "life" is artificially
maintained by mechanical devices should be established by proof of irre-
versible damage incompatible with life, e .g. the irreparable character of
the alterations of the central nervous system taken as a whole. This proof
would be based on a systematic analysis of the circumstances in which the
lesions took place ; on the total absence of all reflexes ; on the presence of
complete bilateral mydriasis, a flat encephalogram and the artificial nature
of blood circulation and respiration the spontaneous activities of which are
null or incapable of maintaining vital functions without mechanical devices ;
and, possibly on the existence of large lesions of the central nervous system
directly observable as in the case of open head injuries .
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in a position of conflict of interest . Conversely, the medical team
working to save the donor's life should not be the same as the one
looking after the intended recipient of the transplant.
From a moral and ethical point of view, a very important
question is-assuming that all hope is abandoned for saving the
patient-when can supportive therapy be withdrawn? Is it right in
such a case to maintain the circulation and the respiration by
artificial means for the sole purpose of saving this patient's vital
organs which if transplanted into another person might save the
latter's life? If the physician were to wait until death occurred
in the conventional sense, the possibility of a successful transplanta-
tion would decrease considerably .
It must be noted that in 1957, Pope Pius XII when asked in
which circumstances a doctor should stop artificial respiration to
a patient who is virtually dead, replied that any mechanical devices
designed to prolong life involved extraordinary treatment. A phys-
ician is only obligated to give ordinary treatment to a patient. If
the physician, after consulting the patient's family, believes that
there is no hope of prolonging life without the equipment, he is
morally entitled to stop the respirator . Death is caused by the
disease or injury not by stopping the machine. The Pope indicated
that Roman Catholic theology was not concerned with the defini-
tion of death."
From a psychological point of view, it is doubtful whether the
public at large would accept the idea of removal of vital organs
from "living" persons prior to what is now commonly accepted as
death.
Perhaps, from the point of view of an individual's right to life,
because of the special interest of transplanters and possible abuses,
it might be better not to extend the definition of death but rather
restrict it.
11. Legal Problems .
We are concerned here with homotransplants although it is quite
possible that in the near future heterotransplants will also be suc-
cessful.
What are the legal problems involved in human organ trans-
plantation?" In general, they are related to live donors, cadavers,
"November 24th, 1957 . Discorsi ai Medici (1959), pp. 608-618.
"Bibliography : See Vestal, Taber, Shoemaker, Medico-Legal Aspects of
Tissue Homotransplantation (1955), 18 U. of Detroit L.J. 171; Wasmuth,
Stewart, Medical and Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation
(1965), 14 Cleveland-Marshall L. Rev. 442 also in Law for the Physician
(1966), ch . 17, p. 445 et seq . ; Louisell, Transplantation : Existing Legal
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recipients, attending physicians and next of kin. For instance, in
what circumstances may a volunteer donor be considered free
from undue influence? Is it legal to "mutilate" a healthy donor
for the advantage of another person? Should the donation of organs
or parts of the body be limited to those that could not produce a
permanent deficiency in the donor? Should the donor be allowed
to consent to a serious operation upon himself for the benefit of
another, especially when, as a result of the removal of the donated
organ, his health might be seriously endangered with only the
prospect of a moderate prolongation of the receiver's life? Should
the State intervene in such cases? What type of special protection
should be given to minors, people of low intelligence or prisoners
in regard to donations of organs or tissues?
Should death be defined and, in this connexion, for how long
should "life" be maintained in a donor with irrevocable damage
to the brain? When does death occur if such a "life" is artificially
maintained?"
Should payment or indemnification be received by the donor
for his organs? More generally, should human organs or tissues be
available for sale?
If it is legal to sell organs, must the amount of money paid
to the donor be included in his income tax or is it a capital gain?
Is the sale subject to safes tax? If the organ is given by the donor
to the recipient, should a gift tax be paid? Finally, should the
value of usable organs from cadavers be included in the decedent's
estate?
What are the standards to be applied to the recipient's consent
to a transplant?
Is it suicide if the intended recipient of a transplant refuses to
be operated upon?
Should parents or guardians have the right to refuse treatment
to their children?
Should a surgeon be allowed to take an organ out of a cadaver
without the deceased family's permission in order to save a life?
hat can or cannot be removed from a cadaver and who can give
Constraints, in Ethics in Medical Progress (1966), p . 78; Packel, Spare
Parts for the Human Engine (1965), 37 Penn . Bar Assoc . Quarterly 71 ;
Sanders, Dukeminier, Medical Advance and Legal Lag : Homodialysis and
Kidney Transplantation, op. cit., footnote 4; A Symposium : Some Legal
Problems in Medical Treatment and Research (1968), 36 Fordham L . Rev .
639 ; Price, Legal Rights and Duties in Regard to Dead Bodies, Post Mor-
tems and Dissections (1951), 68 South African L.3. 403 ; Regan, Doctor
and Patient and the Law (3rd ed., 1956) ; Dierkens, Les droits sur le corps
et le cadavre de l'homme (1966), especially pp . 56-65 ; Stickel, Organ
Transplantation in Medical and Legal Perspectives (1967), 32 Law and
Contemp . Prob . 597 ; Stason, The Role of Law in Medical Progress, !bid.,
at p. 563, esp. at pp. 567, 580, 586 .
	
11 See preceding section .
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legal permission? Are testamentary bequests binding on the heirs
or next of kin?
Which provincial law applies in determining who controls the
body of a deceased person?
What type of regulations are necessary to control the inter-
provincial shipment of organs?
Should penalties be provided for wrongful removal of organs
from a live donor or from a cadaver?
Has a dead body "human" rights to be protected?
What would be the liability of a surgeon who lost a patient,
the recipient, owing to his ignorance of the very latest developments
in regard to compatibility or some other aspect of transplantation?
Some of these questions will be examined in this article,
having in mind existing legal rules in Canada . As many of these
questions have not yet been considered by the courts or the legis
latures, an attempt will be made to suggest some possible answers
and the areas where legislative action should take place.
In the field of transplantation, the practical possibilities are
limitless . Scientific progress is so rapid that it is not easy for the law
to keep up with it . New techniques require new regulations . The
legal solutions must be constantly reappraised to reflect medical
improvements as they affect present-day life . The various Human
Tissue Acts adopted by the Provinces of Canada are, in some
respects, already obsolete and need to be revised . In view of the
tremendous future of organ transplantation and the public interest
it has aroused, the legislator, once appraised of the problems
involved, must step in and, in consultation with the medical pro-
fession, adopt rules that will protect the individual against possible
abuses but at the same time remove some of the legal constraints
that might limit further medical progress . Laws dealing with scien-
tific matters should be periodically revised. There is hardly any
reason why the body of a deceased person could not be made avail-
able to any designated hospital automatically upon death to provide
organs for someone else, unless the hospital authorities have
reason to believe that the deceased in his lifetime had forbidden
this to be done .
l . Problems Relating to the Live Donor, the Recipient, the
Hospital and the Membersof the Team Performing the Opera-
tion .
A. General.
A surgeon owes to his patient a duty in tort as well as in con-
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tract." He is civilly liable in damages if he performs an operation
in a negligent and unskilful manner." In some of these cases, he
may also be charged with criminal negligence." If he operates
without the express consent of the patient, except in cases of
emergency, when obviously, the operation is necessary to save
life, he is civilly liable for assault (if the patient is conscious at
the time) and battery."
From a philosophical point of view, it is objectively difficult
to accept the view that a transplantation operation or any other
necessary operation is a lawful infliction of harm. As far as the
recipient is concerned, it certainly is a beneficial act.
Naturally before an operation, the hospital and the members
of the transplantation team will want to be certain that they are
protected from possible legal action by the donor or the recipient.
Professional Skill and Knowledge.
Would the members of the transplantation team be civilly liable
if they lost the recipient of the transplant as a result of their ignor-
l' See Miller, the Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons,
[1953] Wash. U . L. Q. 413 .
Is In general see Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (3rd ed., 1964),
pp. 33 et seq ., 102 et seq., 164 et seq . ; Gray, Law and the Practice of
Medicine (1955) ; Wasmuth, Law for the Physician (1966) ; Fleming, the
Law of Torts (3rd ed., 1965), pp . 115-116 ; Haines, Gibson, Courts and
Doctors (1952), 30 Can . Bar Rev . 483, 498 . For the civil law position see
Crépeau, La responsabilité civile du médecin et de l'établissement hospitalier
(1956) ; La responsabilité médicale et hospitalière dans la jurisprudence
québecoise récente (1960), 20 R. du B. 433 ; La responsabilité civile médi-
cale et hospitalière (1968) ; Mereditb, Malpractice Liability of Doctors and
Hospitals (1956) ; Savatier, Problèmes juridiques de la greffe humaine,
Cahiers Laënnec (1956), No. 1, pp. 21-27 . In a recent case, Sirianni v.
Anna (1967), 285 N.Y.S. 2d 709, it was held that a cause of action did
not exist in favor of a donor of a human organ against a defendant who
removed a vital organ from the donee in a negligent manner. The court
was of the opinion that the conduct of the donor in surrendering one of
her kidneys to preserve the life of her son was a clearly defined, indepen-
dent, intervening act with full knowledge of the consequences. There was
no room for the "rescue doctrine to apply" . (See Eckert v. Long Island
Railroad Co . (1871), 43 N.Y . 502 ; Wagner v. International Railway Co .
(1921), 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E . 437, 19 A.L.R . 1 .) The plaintiff had
alleged that her health had been impaired by the loss of one of her kidneys
which she had voluntarily donated to her son who was dying of a kidney
ailment . She sought damages against the defendants on the theory that their
negligent conduct in removing the kidneys from her son was available to
her in order to maintain the action.
I s Canadian Criminal Code, S.C ., 1953-54, c. 51, as am ., ss 187, 188,
191, 192, 193, and 45. See also s. 230 ; and Simard v. the Queen (1963),
43 C.R . 70, [1963] Que. Q.B. 572 (C.A.) .
" Yule v . Parmley, [1945] S.C.R . 635, at p . 645, [1945] 4 D.L.R . 81, at
p . 89 ; Bonner v . Moran (1941), 126 F. 2d 121 (U.S.C.A . Distr . Col.) ;
Mulloy v . Hop Sang, [1935] 1 W.W.R. 714 (Sask. C.A.) ; for a review of
some of the cases see Marshall v. Curry, [1933] 3 D.L.R . 260, 60 Can .
C.C . 136 (N.S .S.C.) . Note that in the United States of America it has been
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ante of the latest developments in the field of transplantation?
The answer to this question is the same for any kind of new
treatment. The members of the team would not incur liability if
they made diligent use of all the information which could reason-
ably be available to them."
In general, each case must depend upon its own circumstances.
A surgeon is not an actual insurer, he does not undertake that he
will cure." He only owes a duty to the patient to use the diligence,
care, knowledge, skill and caution in performing the operation
of an average technician of the special class to which he belongs."
If he holds himself out as a specialist in transplantation techniques
and the patient accepts treatment with that understanding, he
must possess a higher degree of skill with respect to transplanta-
tion than the ordinary surgeon." The standard of care is modified
accordingly.
The size and character of the community in which a surgeon
practises, and the facilities available there are some of the factors
that will be taken into account by the courts in applying the general
professional standard. Thus, recently, in the United States of
America, it has been held in Brune v. Belinkog that "the proper
standard is whether the physician, if a general practitioner, has
exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified
practitioner, taking into account the advances in the profession .
In applying this standard it is permissible to consider the medical
held that while an unauthorized operation is, in contemplation of law, an
assault and battery, it also amounts to malpractice, even though negligence
is not charged. (Physicians' and Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray (1941),
8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P. 2d 568) . It would seem that the two claims of negli-
gence and assault and battery are inconsistent and could not be maintained
in the same action, since negligence depends on the presence of authority
and assault and battery upon the absence of contract or authority: Cady
v. Fraser (1950), 122 Colo . 252, 222 P. 2d 422.
"For a case involving a type of operation that was in its infancy in
Ontario at the time and a very distinct and notable advance in the practice
of medicine see Aynsley et al . v. Toronto General Hospital et al., [1968]
1 O.R . 425, (1968), 66 D.L.R. (2d) 575 (H.C .), at pp. 586-587.
2"Challand v. Bell (1959), 18 D.L.R . (2d) 150 (Alta S.C .), Marshall
v. Rogers, [1943] 4 D.L.R. 68, at p. 72 (B.C.C.A .) ; H6tel-Dieu St Vallier
v. Martel, [1968] Que. Q.B . 389, at p. 798 (C.A.) ."a For instance, Crysler v. Pearce, [1943] O.R . 735, [1943] 4 D.L.R .
738 (H.C .) ; Anderson v. Chasney and Sisters of St. Joseph, [1950] 4
D.L.R . 223 (Can.) ; Nesbitt v. Holt, [1953] 1 S.C.R . 143; Challand v. Bell,
ibid .; Town v. Archer (1902), 4 O.L.R . 383, per Falconbridge C.J., at pp .
387-388 (competent degree of skill and knowledge) . In general see Prosser,
op. tit., footnote 18, pp. 164-168; Fleming, op . tit., footnote 18, pp. 115-
116; Meredith, op . tit ., footnote 18, p. 60 et seq. See also A Symposium
on Professional Negligence (1959), 12 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 535-648.
"In general see Regan, op . tit., footnote 15 ; McCaffrey v. Hague,
[1949] 2 W.W.R . 539, [19491 4 D.L.R . 291 (Man . Q.B .) .
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resources available to the physician as one circumstance in de-
termining the skill and care required. Binder this standard some
allowance is thus made for the type of community in which the
physician carries on his - practice . . . . One holding himself out as
a specialist should be held to the standard of care and skill of the
average member of the profession practising the specialty, taking
into account the advances of the profession . And as in the case of
the general practitioner, it is permissible to consider the medical
resources available to him"." The courts will not condemn an
honest exercise of judgment even though other practitioners may
disagree with that judgment." If a surgeon followed a method of
operation that is an established practice although not approved
by all surgeons, he will not be liable in damages."'
In Wilson v. Swanson,"e a case which involved an error of
judgment on the part of a surgeon, the Supreme Court of Canada
laid down a threefold test : "(1) The surgeon undertakes that he
possesses the skill, knowledge and judgment of the average. (2)
In judging that average, regard must be had to the special group
to which he belongs. From a general practitioner at a rural point,
a different standard is exacted than from a specialist at an urban
point. (3) If the decision was the result of exercising that average
standard, there is no liability for an error in judgment.""
Rand J. said :" "In the presence of such a delicate balance of
2s (1968), 235 N.E. 2d 793, at p. 798. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts overruled Small v. Howard (1880), 128 Mass . 131 which
had first enunciated the so-called "community" or "locality" rule that the
defendant is bound "to possess that skill only which physicians and surgeons
of ordinary ability and skill, practising in similar localities, with opportuni-
ties for no larger experience, ordinarily possess; and he [is] not bound to
possess that high degree of art and skill possessed by eminent surgeons
practising in large cities, and making a specialty of the practice of sur-
gery". Small v. Howard has been followed and applied by a long line of
cases some of which are quite recent . The "community" or "locality" rule
has been modified in several American jurisdictions and criticized in legal
periodicals (McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners (1959),
12 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 549, at p. 569 et seq.) . Some courts have extended
the geographical area that constitutes the community; others have em-
phasized such factors as accessibility to medical facilities and experience;
still others have adopted a standard of reasonable care which allows the
locality to be taken into account as one of the circumstances, but not as an
absolute limit upon the skill required. In cases involving specialists the
courts of several American states have completely abandoned the "locality"
rule . For a survey see Brune v. Belinkoff, ibid. In Canada cf. Zirkler v.
Robertson (1897), 30 N.S.R . 61 (S.C .) ; Challand v. Bell, supra, footnote
22.
"s Challand v. Bell, ibid.
2'Davy v. Morrison, [1932] Q.R . 1 (App . Div.) .
"8 [1956] S.C.R . 804, 5 D.L.R . (2d) 113 .




Supra, footnote 28, at pp . 119-120 (D.L.R .) .
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factors, the surgeon is placed in a situation of extreme difficulty ;
whatever is done runs many hazards from causes which may only be
guessed at ; what standard does the law require of him in meeting
it? What the surgeon by his ordinary engagement undertakes with
the patient is that he possesses the skill, knowledge and judgment
of the generality or average of the special group or class of techni-
cians to which he belongs and will faithfully exercise them. In a
given situation some may differ from others in that exercise, de-
pending on the significance they attribute to the factors in the light
of their own experience . The dynamics of the human body of each
individual are themselves individual and there are lines of doubt
and uncertainty at which a clear course of action may be precluded .
There is here only the question of judgment ; what of that?
The test can be no more than this : was the decision the result
of the exercise of the surgical intelligence professed? or was what
was done such that, disregarding it may be the exceptional case or
individual, in all the circumstances, at least the preponderant opin-
ion of the group would have been against it? If a substantial
opinion confirms it, there is no breach or failure. . . .
An error in judgment has long been distinguished from an
act of unskilfulness or carelessness or due to lack of knowledge .
Although universally accepted procedures must be observed, they
furnish little or no assistance in resolving such a predicament as
faced the surgeon here . In such a situation a decision must be
made without delay based on limited known and unknown factors ;
and the honest and intelligent exercise of judgment has long been
recognized as satisfying the professional obligation."
In the United States of America, it is pointed out by Professor
Prosser" that by undertaking to render medical services a physician
or surgeon holds himself out as having standard professional skill
and knowledge . "He must have the skill and learning commonly
possessed by members of the profession in good standing, and he
will be liable if harm results because he does not have them . . . .
Sometimes this is called the skill of the `average' member of the
profession ; but this is clearly misleading, since only those in good
professional standing are to be considered, and of these it is not the
middle but the minimum common skill which is to be looked to .' eaz
This distinguished author is of the opinion that the standard
is "one of `good medical practice' which is to say what is customary
and usual in the profession"."
"Op. cit., footnote 18, pp . 164-168 .
ss Ibid ., p . 165 . 11 Ibid ., pp. 167-168 .
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C. Consent.
(i) Adults
The doctor-patient relationship is contractual and arises out of
an express or implied agreement." When such a contract exists,
does consent to the doctor-patient relationship-which includes
acceptance of treatment in general-necessarily imply consent to
surgical treatment?" The answer will depend upon the circum-
stances.
When is the patient's express consent to an operation needed?
What is the nature and scope of such consent? What weight will
be given to it when it has been obtained? In other words, what
are _the standards to be applied to the donor's and recipient's
consent to a transplantation operation? Is the surgeon obliged
to educate the patient about the operation before a valid consent
may be given? What rules should be followed in the case of minors,
prisoners and mentally deficient people? Should minors close to
maturity be allowed to express their opinion? What if the parent
or guardian refuses to give his consent?"
In Bonner v. Moran" the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, was of the opinion that a surgical opera-
tion is a technical battery regardless of its result, and excusable
only when there is express or implied consent by the patient. The
rule is well established that ". . . before a physician or surgeon
may perform an operation upon a patient, he must obtain the
34 For â case involving the liability of a hospital see Lavere v . Smith's
Falls Public Hospitals (1915), 35 O.L.R . 98, 26 D.L.R . 346 (App . Div.) .
In Quebec, see Cr6peau, La responsabilité médicale et hospitalière dans la
jurisprudence qu6becoise r6cente, op. cit ., footnote 18, at p. 452 . Also
X v . Mellen, [1957] Que . Q.B . 389 (C.A.), at p . 409 ; G . v . C . and de
Coster, [1960] Que. Q.B . 161 (C.A .) and H6tel-Dieu St Pallier v. Martel,
supra, footnote 22, at p. 798 . In general see American Law Institute, Re-
statement of the Law of Torts (1934), s . 892 (comment) ." Express consent is not usually required for minor procedures, as such
consent is implied in the doctor-patient relationship . Prosser, op. cit ., foot-
note 18, p. 105, points out that the surgeon will not incur liability if the
consent given is sufficiently general in its terms to cover the particular
operation, or where the surgeon is authorized with complete freedom to do
whatever he thinks best to remedy what he finds . Of course if the patient
prohibits the operation the surgeon is not relieved from liability by his
good intentions in proceeding with it . It could be argued that a double
consent is necessary : (a) consent to the doctor-patient relationship and
(b) consent to the treatment. For an interesting case see Beausoleil v . La
Communauté des Soeurs de la Charité de la Providence, [1965] Que . Q.B .
37, (1964), 53 D.L.R . (2d) 65 (Qué . C.A.) . In general see Meredith, op .
cit., footnote 18, p . 139 et seq . ; also Dierkens, op . cit., footnote 15, p . 49 ." In general see Shinkle, Consent to Medical and Surgical Treatment
(1966), 14 Drake L. Rev. 101 ; Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent"
(1968), 36 Fordham L . Rev . 639 ; Ritts, A Physician's View of Informed
Consent in Human Experimentation (1968), 36 Fordham L. Rev. 631 ; Op-
penheim, Informed Consent to Medical Treatment (1962), 11 Cleveland
Marshall L . Rev. 249 ; Stason, op . cit ., footnote 15, at p. 580 .
37 Supra, footnote 20.
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consent either of the patient, if competent to give it, or of some-
one legally authorized to give it for him, unless immediate opera-
tion is necessary to save the patient's life or health, although under
exceptional circumstances the consent may be regarded as having
been impliedly given" ."
One of the leading cases in the United States of America is
Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital's where Mr. Justice
Cardozo stated : "Every human being of adult years and sound mind
has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and
a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's consent,
commits an assault for which he is liable in damages."" It is diffi-
cult to imagine a situation where the doctrine of emergency could
Is Annotation (1932), 76 A.L.R . 562, Also Bang v. Charles T. Miller
Hospital (1958), 251 Minn . 427, 88 N.W. 2d 186. In a case of emergency,
when the patient is unconscious, the surgeon should act according to his
own best judgment and consent on the part of the injured person would be
implied: Mohr v. Williams (1905), 104 N.W . 12, at p. 15, 95 Minn . 261,
at p. 269. If a surgeon is confronted with an emergency which endangers
the life or health of the patient he "may lawfully, and it is his duty to
perform such operation as good surgery demands, without such consent" :
Pratt v. Davis (1906), 224 111 . 300, at p. 310, 79 N.E. 562, at p. 565. See
also Jackovach v. J'ocum (1931), 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444, 76 A.L.R .
551. In O'Brien v. Cunard SS Co . Ltd. (1891), 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E .
266, it was held that where one on ship-board voluntarily submits to vac-
cination by the ship's physician in order to obtain the proper certificate to
pass quarantine, she cannot maintain an action against the ship-owner for
assault by the physician for performing such vaccination . Statutes in many
provinces place a duty on parents to have their children vaccinated against
small pox; see for instance in Quebec, Public Health Act, R.S.Q ., 1964, c.
1961, ss . 124, 125, 132.
In Canada see Mulloy v. Hop Sang, supra, footnote 20 ; Beausoleil v.
La Connnunauté des Soeurs de la Charité, supra, footnote 35 ; Dufresne v.
X, [1961] Que. S.C . 119. Cf. Lafresnièr e v. Hôpital Maisonneuve et autres,
[1963] Que. S.C . 467 (express consent to a special anaesthetic not neces-
sary), in Marshall v. Curry, supra, footnote 20, Chisholm C.J . said at pp.
274-275 (D.L.R .) : "1) that in the ordinary case where there is opportunity
to obtain the consent of the patient it must be had. A person's body must be
held inviolate and immune from invasion by the surgeon's knife, if an oper-
ation is not consented to ; 2) that such consent by the patient may be express
or implied. If an operation is forbidden by the patient, consent is not to be
implied; and `it must be constantly remembered that in this connection
silence does not give consent, nor is compliance to be taken as consent' ."
Where an emergency arises which could not be anticipated it is not useful
to strain the law by establishing consent by fictions. "It is better to rule that
it is the surgeon's duty to act in order to save the life or preserve the health
of the patient ; and that in the honest execution of that duty he should not
be exposed to legal liability." In Murray v. McMurchy, [194912 D.L.R . 442,
1 W.W.R. 989 (B.C .), the possibility of future hazard did not absolve the
surgeon from obtaining consent. Prosser, op. cit ., footnote 18, p. 105 points
out that the consent is to the surgeon's conduct. If the surgeon goes be-
yond the consent given he is liable "unless the situation is one of unfore-
seen emergency, critical in its nature, which will justify the surgeon in
proceeding on the assumption that the patient would consent if he were
conscious and understood the situation" .a (1914), 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E . 92.
4°Jbid., at pp. 129 (N.Y.), 93 (N.E.) .
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be applied to a live donor of a transplant . On the other hand, in
the case of the recipient of a transplant from a dead donor, there
may be occasions where the surgeon could be faced with an
emergency situation, as for instance where an unconscious recipi-
ent's curve of life is declining fast and the dead victim of an ac-
cident becomes available for a transplantation operation which
must take place immediately. 1t all depends upon the circum-
stances."
Failure to disclose the risks known to the surgeon invalidates
the consent. Thus, even though the donor or the recipient has
signed a written consent, it might not exonerate the surgeon from
civil liability if it is possible to prove that he withheld facts that
were necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent to the
' As to unauthorized extension of surgery see Meredith, op. cit., foot-
note 18, p. 144 et seq. Unless he has received the patient's authority for
that purpose, a surgeon is not, as a general rule, justified in extending the
surgery or treatment beyond the scope of the consent merely because in
his opinion it is in the patient's interest to do so . Unauthorized extension
is justified in cases of emergency only when strict adherence to the terms
of the consent would endanger the life or health of the patient: Murray
v. McMurchy, supra, footnote 38 . However, after the patient has consented
to the general nature of the treatment, it is not necessary for the doctor
to obtain his consent to every technical procedure necessary to cure him.
See Male v. Hopmans, [1966] 1 O.R. 647, (1965), 54 D.L.R. (2d) 592,
aff'd, [1967] 2 O.R. 457 (C.A.) .
' See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr Univ . Board of Trustees (1957), 154
Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170 (App . Div.) ; Woods v. Brumlop (1962),
71 N.M. 221, 377 P. 2d 520, at p. 524; Mitchell v. Robinson (1960), 334
S.W . 2d .11, 79 A.L.R . 2d 1017 and Annot. Also McCoid, A Reappraisal
of Liability For Unauthorized Medical Treatment (1956-57), 41 Minn . L.
Rev. 381.
"When the case involves no substantial misunderstanding of the nature
and character of the touching, but plaintiff claims he was not fully or cor-
rectly informed as to collateral hazards attendant upon the procedure, the
judicial approach is quite different from that found in battery cases. Here
defendant-physician's obligation and plaintiff-patient's corresponding right
is less certain in nature, more flexible in character and- subject to consider-
able variation . While it is often stated as a general proposition that the
patient has the right to be advised of collateral hazards and the physician
has the duty so to advise him most cases have recognized . . . that this obli-
gation is not rigid and cannot be prescribed with specificity . It is only a part
of the broad obligation of the physician to use reasonable care, but as any
sophisticated person knows, the elasticity in that concept is more than
negligible ." See Plante, op. cit., footnote 36 at p. 653.
In the battery cases, the factual issue is as follows : "Did the physician,
by the words he spoke, or by his incomplete statement, or by his failure to
explain written words, leave the patient with a substantial misunderstanding
as to the general nature and character of the touching which the patient
was to undergo? . . . When we turn to medical negligence cases . . . the
question is not whether defendant conveyed a clear impression of the nature
and character of the intended touching. It is assumed that he did so . The
question is whether defendant violated his obligation to the patient to des-
cribe, collateral consequences that might ensue as a result of the intended
and permitted touching, or from some other source such as the healing
process." Ibid., pp . 657-658.
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transplant." The surgeon must not minimize the known dangers
of the operation in order to induce his patient's consent . However,
in discussing the element of risk involved in the transplantation,
the surgeon has such discretion that is consistent with the full
disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent' In other
words, the patient must have knowledge of what he consents to .
As stated in Bowers v. Talmage:' "Unless a person who gives
consent to an operation knows its dangers and the degree of
danger, a `consent' does not represent a choice and is ineffectual."
It would seem that in the case of a transplantation operation,
the type of risk involved and the novelty of the operation should
have a bearing on the completeness of the disclosure required . In
order for the consent to be knowing and voluntary, the donor and
the recipient are certainly entitled to full disclosure of all possible
serious collateral hazards . For instance recent medical research
seems to indicate that the powerful drugs used to prevent the
body from rejecting an organ transplant may leave the recipient
vulnerable to cancer because his defences have been immobilized."
Of course, the surgeon's duty does not mean that he must
apprise the patient of each infinitesimal or speculative element
"For a case involving the testing of a new anaesthetic see Halushka v.
University of Saskatchewan (1965), 53 D.L.R . (2d) 436 (Sask . C.A .) . The
court said : "In ordinary medical practice the consent given by a patient to
a physician or surgeon to be effective must be an `informed' consent freely
given. It is the duty of the physician to give a fair and reasonable explana-
tion of the proposed treatment including the probable effect and any special
or unusual risks . . . . There can be no exceptions to the ordinary require-
ments of disclosure in the case of research as there may be in ordinary
practice . The researcher does not have to balance the probable effect of
lack of treatment against the risks involved in the treatment itself. The
example of risks being properly hidden from a patient when it is important
that he should not worry can have no application in the field of research .
The subject of medical experimentation is entitled to a full and frank dis-
closure of all the facts, probabilities and opinions which a reasonable man
might be expected to consider before giving his consent." Noted Mac-
Kienzie (1966) . 1 Ottawa L . Rev . 236 . See also Kenny v. Lockwood, [19321
1 D.L.R . 507, [19321 O.R . 141 (C.A.) and Nuremberg Principles, infra,
footnote 74 .
'Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr Univ. Board of Trustees, supra, footnote
42, at p. 181 (P .) ." (1964), 159 So . 2d 888, at p. 889 (Fla) .
'In Male v. Hopinans, supra, footnote 41, it was held that in view of
the plaintiff's serious condition, the defendant was justified in using a drug
according to good medical practice and it was unnecessary to obtain con-
sent for every technical procedure to effect a cure . Cf . Smith v. Auckland
Hospital Board, [19651 N.Z.L.R . 191 (C.A .) .
Note that the most common cause of death among heart transplant
patients has been the overall state of their health before the operation . Al-
most anyone sick enough to qualify for a heart transplant may already
be too sick to survive . As a result, standards for deciding who should
receive transplants are changing. See Time Magazine, May 24th, 1968,
Canada Edition, p . 47 .
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making up such risks as it would often be psychologically harmful
to frighten him with too remote possibilities.'
Professor grosser", maintains that in the light of the possible
highly undesirable effects upon a number of patients of disclosure
of some medical or surgical risks, it would be better to treat dis
closure as a question of negligence involving professional standards
of conduct only.
A transplant operation is a new type of operation of a very
serious nature especially for the live donor and he should be
given adequate explanations. to decide whether he would rather
forego surgery than submit to it . There is always the danger in-
volved that an overly enthusiastic transplant, team may not disclose
all that is relevant to the operation to be performed in order to
prevent the patient from withdrawing.
Obviously, an unconscious person who has not given prior
consent should never be a donor. In the case of an unconscious
recipient, the consent should be sought of the next of kin unless it
is an emergency.
Of course, where there is an active misrepresentation on the
part of the surgeon, the consent given is invalid."
Actually, it could be argued that a live donor should not be
able to consent to a serious operation upon himself for the benefit
of another especially when as a result of the removal of the
donated organ, his health may be seriously endangered with only
the prospect of a moderate prolongation of the receiver's life.
Some day the donor could be in desperate need of the missing
organ."
44 In general see McCoid, The Care Required 'of Medical Practitioners
(1959), 12 Vand. IJ. Rev . 549, at pp. 586-597 .
4s op. cit., footnote 18, pp. 106-107 .
4s Woods v. - Brumlop, supra, footnote 42, at p . 525 (P.) . See also Paul-
sen v. Gundersen (1935), 218 Wis . 578, 260 N.W. 448 ."Even if such consent is given by the donor, it may not protect the
surgeon performing the transplant operation from possible criminal respon-
sibility arising from non-compliance with s. 45 of the Canadian Criminal
Code, supra, footnote 19, which states that "Every one is protected from
criminal responsibility for performing a surgical operation upon any person
for the benefit of that person if
(a) the operation is performed with reasonable care and skill, and
(b) it is reasonable to perform the operation, having regard to the
state of health of the person at the time the operation is performed
and to all the circumstances of the case" . (Italics mine) .
that
This section should be read in connexion with s . 191 which provides
"(1) Every one is criminally negligent who
(a) in doing anything, or
(b) in omitting to do anything that is his duty to do, shows wanton
or reckless disregard for the lives or safety of other persons.
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Stricter standards should be applied to the donor's consent
than to the recipient's consent. For instance, in the case of a live
donor, it may be advisable to assess his physical and psychiatric
health as a condition precedent to his giving an organ. This
examination could be made by a board consisting of an inde-
pendent physician, the surgeon who will carry out the transplanta-
tion operation and a representative of the hospital where the opera-
tion will be performed or of the Department of Health.
Another solution would be to require the donor's consent to
be given to a judge or magistrate of his domicile or residence or
of the district where the hospital where the transplantation will
be carried out is located. The judge or magistrate or the medical
board wouldmake sure that the volunteer donor is free from undue
influence . This is particularly important in the case of prisoners.
Actually, it is better to refuse transplants from persons under
restraint . Where there is evidence that strong pressures are exer-
cised on the donor, he should not be allowed to give consent.
Finally, it is essential that the consent of the donor or the
recipient be revocable at any time .
From a practical point of view, although consent to surgery
does not have to be in writing to be valid, it is preferable to have
the patient sign a written document to that effect" in the presence
of witnesses after careful explanation of the risks involved in the
operation by the head of the transplantation team."
(2) For the purpose of this section `duty' means a duty imposed by
law" .
As far as the donor is concerned, the surgical operation performed upon
him, for instance, the removal of a healthy kidney, is certainly not for his
benefit, and may be considered unreasonable within the terms of s. 45(b) .
On the other hand s. 187 of the Criminal Code which provides that
"Every one who undertakes to administer surgical or medical treatment to
another person or to do any other lawful act that may endanger the life
of another person is, except in cases of necessity, under a legal duty to
have and to use reasonable knowledge, skill and care in so doing" does
not require the surgical treatment to be for the benefit of the patient . See
also ss 191-193 and R. v. Giardine (1939), 71 C.C.C. 295 (Ont .) .
"As to forms of consent to operations see Meredith, op . cit., footnote
18, pp. 147-150.
" The following forms are used by the Toronto General Hospital :
TORONTO GENERAL HOSPITAL
CONSENT TO KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
PUBLIC PATIENT DONOR
Name of patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case No. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marital status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 . I authorize such surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants as may be on
the staff of the Toronto General Hospital or as may be selected or approved
by a member of its medical staff to operate and/or assist in operating on
me for the purpose of removing one of my kidneys and placing such kidney
in the body of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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2.
	
Dr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has explained to me, and I
understand, the nature of and the risks involved in such an operation, in-
cluding the risk that the kidney so removed may not function when trans-
planted and the risk that my remaining kidney may be, or subsequently
become injured or diseased.
3. If any condition is discovered at the time of the operation that was
not previously apparent and that in the judgment of the operating surgeon
calls for surgical procedures in addition to or in substitution for those ini-
tially contemplated, I authorize him to take whatever measures he may
consider necessary.
4. The name and address of my spouse, parent, child, nearest relative
or nearest friend, is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Signature of patient
Witness Address
PRIVATE PATIENT DONOR
1. I authorize the surgeon whom I have engaged, or who has been en-
gaged on my behalf together with other surgeons, anaesthetists and assis-
tants of his own selection as he may require, to operate and/or assist in
operating on me for the purpose of removing one of my kidneys and
placing such kidney in the body of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
[Clauses 2, 3 and 4 are the same as in the case of a public patient donor.]
TORONTO GENERAL HOSPITAL
CONSENT TO KIDNEY TRANSPLANT
PUBLIC PATIENT RECIPIENT
Name of patient . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case No. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marital status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
1 . I authorize such surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants as may be on
the staff of the Toronto General Hospital or as may be selected or approved
by a member of its medical staff to operate and/or assist in operating on
me for the purpose of placing in my body a kidney removed from . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Dr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has explained to me, and I
understand, the nature of and the risks involved in such an operation, in-
cluding the risk that the kidney so removed may not function when trans-
planted to my body .
3. If any condition is discovered at the time of the operation that was
not previously apparent and that in the judgment of the operating surgeon
calls for surgical procedures in addition to or in substitution for those ini-
tially contemplated, I authorize him to take whatever measures he may
consider necessary .
4. The name and address of my spouse, parent, child, 'nearest relative
or nearest friend, is . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..Date ' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Signature of Patient or person ' . . . . . .




1 . I authorize the surgeon whom I have engaged, together with such
other surgeons, anaesthetists and assistants of his own selection as he may
require, to operate and/or assist in operating on me for the purpose of
placing in my body a kidney removed from . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . .
[Clauses 2, 3 and 4 are the same as in the case of a public patient.]
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What would be the position of a surgeon, if an adult, the
intended receiver of the transplant, after having accepted the
doctor-patient relationship, refused to submit to the operation?
What should the surgeon do? If he goes ahead with the operation
without the consent, he may, as noted before, subject himself to
civil liability. If he does not operate, the patient may die and he
may be guilty of criminal negligence." In other words, should the
patient be allowed to take his life into his hands or is the surgeon
justified in going ahead with the transplantation in such circum-
stances? Should he seek prior court authorization? Should welfare
agencies have this adult patient made a ward of the state especially
if he has important social obligations to the community? More
generally, has the patient the "right to die" and if he dies as a result
Wasmuth and Stewart, op. cit., footnote 15, at p. 470, suggest the
following adult live donor consent form :
Permission to Remove Kidney for Transplantation
(Adult Live Donor Form)
Doctor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has explained to me that the life
of . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . is endangered due to irreversible
kidney disease . It has also been explained to me that a kidney can be
transplanted from one person to another by surgical operation . The im-
mediate risks to me of the operation for removal of my kidney, as well
as the possible future permanent injury to my health suffered as a direct
result of the removal of my kidney have been fully explained to me . I am
also aware of the possibility that such kidney transplant might not be
successful .
In an effort to benefit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., I nevertheless
wish and do request, authorize and direct Doctor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to remove one of my kidneys by means of surgical operation in order that
this kidney may be transplanted into . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date Signature of donor
This is to certify that the above form was read and signed by the donor in
my presence . Further, it is my opinion that . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . understands fully the contemplated procedure,
its risks, and possible consequences .
Date Witness
Note that in Quebec "It is forbidden for any administrator of a hospital,
his employees or any physician to require any patient or his representatives
to renounce the responsibility resulting from his hospitalization, medical
examinations, treatments or surgical operations . If such renunciation is
given, it is null", Hospitals Act, R.S.Q ., 1964, c. 164, s. 19 .
Waivers of liability are deemed to be against the public policy of
Quebec : Crépeau, La responsabilité médicale et hospitalière dans la juris-
prudence québecoise récente, op. cit., footnote 18, at p. 449 and Mayrand,
Permis d'opérer et clause d'exon6ration (1953), 31 Can. Bar Rev. 150.
Savatier, Le pr6tendu contrat de permis d'op6rer (1953), 13 R. du B. 205.
Cf. Meredith, op . cit ., ibid., p . 150.
At common law "ordinarily it is not against public policy for one to
exempt the other from responsibility for what would ordinarily be a breach
of duty". Fleming, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 257; Prosser, op . cit., footnote
18, p. 450 et seq.
11 See s . 191(1) of the Canadian Criminal Code, supra, footnote 19.
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of his refusal to submit to the operation, is it suicide?" The in-
tended recipient should have the right to die as long as he weighed
the consequences of the operation against the dangers of accepting
it. As an American court said in the case of a blood transfusion,
the patient must refuse on a calculated decision."
"It is the individual who is the subject of a medical decision
who has the final say and this must necessarily be so in a system
of government which gives the greatest possible protection to the
individual in the furtherance of his own desires.""
Yet should an individual have the right to die particularly
when his death may endanger the public health or welfare of the
community?
(ii) Minors
As in the case of adults, consent, express or implied, is needed
for operations on minors, since at common law all minors are in-
capable of giving a valid consent. Such consent must be given by
the parent or guardian who has control as to what surgery will
be done on his children."
In determining whether a surgeon may operate on a child
without the consent of his parent or guardian, the basic considera-
s4 Did the surgeon "aid" the patient to commit suicide. See Criminal
Code, ibid., s. 212(b) . For an interesting case involving a refusal to receive
blood transfusions see Application of the President and Directors of George-
town,College (1964), 331 I'. 2d 1000, at p . 1008 . The court considered
the argument that if attempted suicide is lawful or not made unlawful, "an
individual's liberty to control himself extends even to the liberty to end
his life". See also Note, The Right. to Die (1966), 18 U . of lçla L. Rev .
591 and Comment, The Right to Die (1964), 9 Utah L. Rev. 161 . In
Canada see ll2asny v. Carter-Halls Aldinger Co., [1929] 3 W.W.R. 741, 24
Sask . L. R . 216 which involved an adult who refused to be operatedupon.
Also Meredith, op . cit., footnote 18, p . 153 et seq . Note that statutory laws
provide for compulsory treatment in special circumstances as for instance
when a person suffering from communicable venereal disease neglects or
refuses to be treated. See in Ontario the Venereal Diseases Protection Act,
R.S.O., 1960, c . 415, ss 2, 4, 10 .
"Erickson v . Dilgard (1962), 252 N.Y.S . 2d 705 . Cf. s . 213 of the
Criminal Code, supra, footnote 19 (attempt to commit suicide) . As to
refusal to submit to treatment see Meredith, op. cit., ibid ., p . 153 .
"Erickson v . Dilgard, ibid., at p. 706 ; Sharpe and Largest, Lifesaving
Treatment for Unwilling Patients (1968), 36 Fordham L. Rev . 695 .s° Bonner v. Moran, supra, footnote 20 . Nathan, Medical Negligence
(1957), p . 171 et seq .; Zoski v . Gaines (1939), 271 Mich . 1, 260 N.W.
99 . In Quebec "the father's consent should always be obtained, failing
which and assuming that to delay the operation would be inadvisable, the
mother's consent is sufficient . If neither parent is living, the consent should
be given by the minor's tutor or curator as the case may be", Meredith
op. cit., footnote 18, p . 140 and Children's Memorial Hospital v . Davidson
(1936), 74 Que . S.C. 268 (father's liability for hospital services) .
370
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL . XLVI
tion is whether the proposed operation is for the benefit of the
child and is done for the purpose of saving his life or limb."
Some American courts seem to feel that a surgeon may be
justified to accept the consent of a minor close to maturity who is
able to understand the nature of the operation which is for his
benefit and is of small importance." However, if there is no
emergency, it is preferable to obtain the parent's or guardian's
consent in addition to that of the minor of mature understanding.
When the operation is for the benefit of another, the consent
of both the parent or guardian and minor should not be dispensed
with under any circumstances. Actually, from a public policy point
of view, it is advisable to prohibit any operation that is not bene-
ficial to the child. Another approach would be to obtain the court's
authorization .
This is what took place for the first time in Massachusetts in
1957 when several requests were made for the transplantation of
a kidney in identical twins who were under twenty-one years of
age. In order to be fully protected against possible criminal and
civil liability, the hospital trustees and surgical staff of the Peter
Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston sought a declaratory judgment
as to whether they should be allowed to perform such a trans-
plantation . In Masden v . Harrison" and in two other cases," the
court authorized the hospital and surgeons to proceed with the
operations."
In each of the three cases, the court relied upon the testimony
of the parents, the fact that the donor and recipient had given their
consent after being fully informed of the nature of the operation
and its possible consequences, and psychiatric evidence that grave
emotional disturbance could affect the health and physical well
being of the donor if the operation could not take place and the
s" Bonner v. Moran, ibid. The emergency doctrine applies to minors
and adults alike. Note that the consent of parents has been dispensed with
when they could not be reached quickly. Luka v. Lowrie (1912), 171
Mich . 222, 136 N.W . 1106 ; see also Jackovach v. Yocum, supra, footnote
38 .
59 Bakker v. Welsh (1906), 144 Mich . 632, 108 N.W . 94 (17 years) to
be compared to Zoski v. Gaines, supra, footnote 57 ; Bishop v. Shurly
(1926), 211 N.W . 75 (19 years) ; Lacey v. Laird (1956), 166 Ohio, St .
12, 139 N.E . 2d, 25 (18 years) ; (1957), 10 Vand . L. Rev. 619; (1957),
9 West Res. L. Rev. 101; however see In re Hudson (1942),, 126 P. 2d 765
(15 years) .
"" No. 68651 Eq. Mass . Sup. Jud. Ct., June 12th, 1957 ."s Huskey v. Harrison, No . 68666 Eq . Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct ., Aug. 30th,
1957 ; Foster v. Harrison, No. 68674 Eq . Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Nov. 20th,
1957 .
"2 For an analysis of the opinions see Curran, A Problem of Consent:
Kidney Transplantation in Minors (1959), 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 891 .
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recipient died as a result of the refusal. Thus, the operation was
deemed to be for the benefit of the donor as well as the recipient.
Actually, the benefit was more the prevention of a possible detri-
ment to the donor. These operations involved twins and it is
questionable whether this argument could be invoked when the
donor and the recipient are not related.
It must be noted that in these cases, the court pointed out that
it is important for the hospital and the surgeon to obtain not
only the consent of the parents but also that of each of the twins
after their being fully informed of the nature of the operation and
of its possible consequences and it is clear that each understands
the situation. Of course, the minors involved were at least fourteen
years old. Would their consent have been required if they had
been younger or incapable of understanding the operation and its
consequences?
Assuming that medically it is feasible and advisable to trans-
plant organs from very small children, it would seem wrong for
acourt to allow the operation on the donor even if parental consent
has been obtained. The courts or the parents should not be allowed
to deprive a child of one of his vital organs without his consent
or his intelligent comprehension. Whether a minor donor close to
maturity should be able to give his consent if he is intelligent
enough to understand the nature and consequences of his act is
a difficult question to answer." As in the case of adult donors some
control is needed to make sure that the minor's consent is the
result of his own decision free from pressure and coercion . In
the case of a recipient minor the situation is different.
Although it is difficult to determine the precise age under
which a child should have no capacity to assent to an operation,
it would seem that below sixteen, a child is too young to give a
valid consent under any circumstances. Public policy demands
legal protection of the personal rights as well as property rights"
"In Banner v. Moran, supra, footnote 20, a case involving a fifteen
year old donor, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the trial
judge had erred in charging that if the jury believed that the boy himself
was capable of appreciating and did appreciate the nature and consequences
of the operation and actually consented or by his ,conduct impliedly con-
sented, the verdict must be for the surgeon . The court rejected s . 59(l) of
the American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law of Torts, supra, foot-
note 34, which takes the view that if the minor is capable of appreciating
the consequences of the invasion and gives an informed consent, there is
no liability even though the parent or guardian has not consented . See also
s . 892 .
11 In the case of a donor of a transplant who is a minor, the issue does
not appear to be one of property law . Thus it is not necessary to obtain
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of individuals who are incapable of intelligent decision by reason
of their youth.
the judicial approval which is often required when dealing with the property
rights of a minor.
Wasmuth and Stewart, op. cit., footnote 15, at pp. 469-470, indicate that
the Peter Bent Brigham Hospital of Boston, Massachusetts uses the follow-
ing live donor permit to transplant kidneys from minors .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . HOSPITAL
Request for Kidney Transplant Operation
in Release of All Claims
Whereas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . born on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and
residing on , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . has a serious
kidney ailment and is in danger of losing . . . . . . . . . . . . life unless an operation
is performed on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : and whereas certain doctors connected with
the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hospital are willing to perform
this operation upon the said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . in the
hope of saving the life of the said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and
whereas the doctors who propose to perform said operations and the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hospital and its staff of doctors and
medical associates wish to be absolved from any and all liability, damages,
law suits and causes of action as a result of the operation, now therefore
in consideration of the operation to be performed and any further opera-
tions which may in the opinion of those doctors be necessary therewith,
we, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,
the intended recipient of the operation and the intended donor fully realiz-
ing that the operation may be unsuccessful and may result in either losing
their life or in future physical incapacity, illness or illnesses directly or in-
directly caused by said operation, we nevertheless both jointly and severally
on behalf of ourselves, our heirs, administrators, executors, and assigns
do hereby request that said operation be performed upon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and hereby RELEASE AND FOREVER
DISCHARGE the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hospital, its
director, and all persons on its medical or surgical staff who are in any way
directly or indirectly connected with said operations or any other future
operations resulting from them, for our post-operative care while in the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hospital, from all damages or causes
of action, either at law or in equity, which we may have or acquire or
which may accrue to us, our heirs, administrators, executors or assigns as
a result of these operations or medical care arising therefrom. We intend
this to be a complete RELEASE AND DISCHARGE of all persons as
well as any corporate entity having anything to do with the operations and
we intend hereby to RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE said
persons from all liability whatsoever . It is clearly understood by all parties
to this instrument that no representations have been made to any of us
regarding the success of the operations, and we fully understand that said
operations are somewhat in the nature of an experiment and are being per-
formed in the hope of saving the life of the said . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . We have read all the statements contained herein and
we fully realize that we are signing a complete release and bar to any
further claims which we may have resulting from these operations .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DONORI
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.RECIPIENT*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .PARENT
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.PARENT.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.WITNESS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.DATE.
. . . . . . . . .I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*Should recipient be a minor, the signature of both parents must be ob-
tained.
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When the parent or guardian refuses to give his consent to
the transplant (or if they cannot be reached), it may be possible
to ask the court to overcome such -refusal if it is felt that the life
of the minor recipient is at stake. It is difficult to imagine a case
where the court would .permit the operation upon the donor as
this operation is not intended to save his life . Many jurisdictions
have statutes that authorize juvenile courts or an agency such
as the Children's Aid Society to take - temporary custody of the
child as a "neglected child" or as a child "in need of protection""
for the period of the treatment and to order necessary surgical
care if the parent or guardian refuses to provide it for such minor
child.',' In other jurisdictions it is possible for the courts, under
statutory authority, to declare the minor a dependent child, and
deprive the parents of custody. A guardian is appointed by the
court with authority to consent to the operation."
As the United States Supreme CouA said in Prince v. Massa-
chusetts:" "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves .
ut it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age
of full and legal discretion when. they can make that choice for
themselves ."
In Ontario for instance, section 19 (1) (b) (x) of the Child
Welfare Act" defines a child in need of protection as inter alia "a
child [under sixteen years of age] where the person in whose charge
he is, neglects or, refuses to provide or secure proper medical,
surgical or other remedial care or treatment necessary for his
health or well-being, or refuses to permit such care or treatment
to be supplied to the child when it is recommended by a duly
qualified medical practitioner . . ." .
Oases will usually be heard by . the judge of a juvenile and
family court having jurisdiction in the place where the child was
taken into protective care." Where he finds the child to be in need
ss The Criminal Code, supra, footnote 19, punishes parents who neglect
their children : s . 186(a) states that everyone is under a legal duty as a
parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a family to provide necessaries
of life for a child under the age of sixteen years; see also s. 189 (aban-
doning a child) . Failure to give medical care has been held to be neglect.
"For instance, New York Social Welfare Law, as am. to' May 16th,
1966, ss 396-398 (McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Annotated) .
See also In re Vasko (1933), 263 N.Y. Supp. 552; In re Rotkowiti (1941),
175 Misc. 948, 25 N.Y. 2d 624. -
67 State of New Jersey v. Perricone (1962), 181 A. 2d 751 (blood trans-
fusion) . Wallace v. Labrenz (1952), 411 111. 618, 104 N.E . 2d 769 (blood
transfusion) ." (1943), 321 U.S . 158, - at p. 170.
	
es S.O., 1965, c. 14, as am.
"Ibid., s . 19(2) .
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of protection he may make an order "that the child be made a
ward of and committed to the care and custody of the [Children's
Aid Society] having jurisdiction in the area in which the child was
taken into the protective care of the society for such period, not ex-
ceeding twelve months, as in the circumstances of the case he con-
siders advisable"." During such period the Children's Aid Society
has and assumes all the rights and responsibilities of a legal guard-
ian of such ward for the purpose of his care, custody and control."
These provisions do not apply to children over sixteen years of
age. Does this mean that between the ages of sixteen and twenty-
one the parent's or guardian's refusal cannot be overcome or that
the minor recipient's consent is sufficient? In some jurisdictions
such a minor may be made a ward of court.
(iii) Married Women
In the common law provinces, a married woman does not
require her husband's consent to an operation. However, in opera-
tions that will or may result in sterility, abortion or miscarriage it
is desirable to obtain the husband's consent.
In the Province of Quebec it is customary to ask the husband's
authorization for an operation on his wife although this does not
seem to be necessary since according to article 177 of the Civil
Code "a married woman has full legal capacity as to her civil
rights subject only to such restrictions as arise from her matri-
monial status". Of course, if the spouses are separate as to property,
no problem arises . When there is community of property between
the consorts, I still think that the authorization of the husband
may be dispensed with as here we are concerned with one of the
wife's basic civil rights . However, if one considers the transplant
as a gift, it could be argued that article 763 which states that "A
wife common as to property must have her husband's consent
to make or accept a gift inter vivos", is applicable.
(iv) Persons of Unsound Mind
When the donor or the recipient of a transplant is of unsound
mind, authorization for the operation should be obtained from the
person in whose custody or care the patient has been committed .
Morally or ethically it would be wrong to allow a mentally de-
ficient person to be a donor.
(v) Conclusions
From the point of view of public policy seen with the eyes of
the donor, it seems that the opportunity of saving a life by rescu-
"Ibid., s . 25(9)(b) . "Ibid., s . 33(1) .
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ing someone from drowning is in many respects comparable to the
situation of a healthy donor giving one of his organs to save the
recipient's life with just the différence that the donor has more
time to make up his mind." On the other hand, the surgeon. is
faced with a delicate problem since he is bound by the Mppocratic
oath to look after the health of his patient and thus cannot de-
liberately deprive a healthy donor of one of his organs.73a
Except perhaps in extraordinary circumstances, as in the case
of identical twins, it is considered almost impossible to support
the view that parents should be allowed to consent to the removal
of organs from their minor children . Actually, legislation should
be passed to prohibit children under a certain age from acting
as donors . Eighteen years of age appears to be a good limit
since in many States or Provinces it is the age when persons
may contract marriage without their parents' consent, can vote, or
join the military forces .
More generally, a donor should never be allowed to give an
unpaired vital organ such as the liver or the heart. In the case
of the kidneys it is not easy to come to a definite conclusion .
Again, the surgeon should refuse to perform the operation when the
benefit to the recipient is problematic and the operation is more
in the nature of a new experiment than for curative purposes .
Here the law has to rely on the conscience of the surgeon. What
is really needed at present is some legal machinery designed to in-
sure that consent has been freely given.'
73 As to the rescue doctrine, see Fleming, op. cit., footnote 18, p. 165
et seq., and Sirlanni v. Anna, supra, footnote 18 . In France transplants
from a living donor are not allowed. Operations are not permitted except
when they are for the benefit of the patient ; see Ethics in Medical Progress
(1966), p. 154.
73aThe Hippocratic oath provides "the regimen I adopt shall be for
the benefit of my patients according to my ability and judgment, and not
for their hurt or for any wrong", History of Medicine (1966), 15 Encyclo-
pedia Britannica 94 B.
74 On August 19th, 1947, a war crimes tribunal at Nuremberg, in a
judgment against defendants who were accused of crimes involving experi-
ments on human subjects, laid down ten standards to which physicians must
conform when performing such experiments . For instance :
"1 . The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give
consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice,
without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress,
overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; and should
have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the sub-
ject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and en-
lightened decision . This latter element requires that before the acceptance
of an affirmative decision by the experimental subject there should be
made known to him the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment ;
the method and means by which it is to be conducted; all inconveniences
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D. Sale of Organs or Tissues by Live Donors .
Should human organs or tissue be available for sale? For in-
stance, should the donor receive payment or indemnification for
a transplant? In Quebec, according to article 1486 of the Civil
Code, "Everything may be sold which is not excluded from being
and hazards reasonably to be expected ; and the effects upon his health or
person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
The duty and responsibility for ascertaining the quality of the consent
rests upon each individual who initiates, directs, or engages in the experi-
ment . It is a personal duty and responsibility which may not be dele-
gated to another with impunity.
2. The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the
good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study, and
not random and unnecessary in nature .
9. During the course of the experiment the human subject should be at
liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physical or
mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him to be im-
possible."
See also the recommendations prepared by the World Medical Asso-
ciation in 1964 :
"II.-Clinical Research Combined with Professional Care
1. In the treatment of the sick person the doctor must be able to use a
new therapeutic measure if in his judgment it offers hope of saving life, re-
establishing health, or alleviating suffering.
If at all possible, consistent with patient psychology, the doctor should
obtain the patient's freely given consent after the patient has been given a
full explanation . In case of legal incapacity consent should also be pro-
cured from the legal guardian; in case of physical incapacity the permission
of the legal guardian replaces that of the patient.
III .Non-therapeutic Clinical Research
1 . In the purely scientific application of clinical research carried out on
a human being it is the duty of the doctor to remain the protector of the
life and health of that person on whom clinical research is being carried
out.
2. The nature, the purpose, and the risk of clinical research must be
explained to the subject by the doctor.
3a . Clinical research on a human being cannot be undertaken without
his free consent, after he has been fully informed ; if he is legally incom-
petent the consent of the legal guardian should be procured .
3b . The subject of clinical research should be in such a mental, physical,
and legal state as to be able to exercise fully his power of choice.
3c . Consent should as a rule be obtained in writing. However, the re-
sponsibility for clinical research always remains with the research worker ;
it never falls on the subject, even after consent is obtained.
4a . The investigator must respect the right of each individual to safe-
guard his personal integrity, especially if the subject is in a dependent rela-
tionship to the investigator.
4b . At any time during the course of clinical research the subject or his
guardian should be free to withdraw permission for research to be con-
tinued . The investigator or the investigating team should discontinue the
research if in his or their judgment it may, if continued, be harmful to the
individual ."
For a case involving an experiment see Halushka v. University of Sas-
katchewan, supra, footnote 43 . See also Burger, op . cit., footnote 3a . Rat-
noff and Smith, Human Laboratory Animals : Martyrs for Medicine (1968),
36 Fordham L. Rev. 673; Fletcher, Human Experimentation: Ethics in the
Consent Situation (1967), 32 Law and Contemp. Prob . 620; Stason, op .
cit., footnote 15, at p. 586, and Hyman v . Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital
(1965), 15 N.Y . 2d 317, 206 N.E . 2d 338, 258 N.Y.S. 2d 397. In France,
see De Larebeyrotte, De J'expérimentation sur l'homme (1954) .
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an object of commerce by its nature or destination or by special
provision of law" .
Article 1059 also specifies that "those things only which are
objects of commerce can become the object of an obligation".
)Furthermore, by virtue of article 1052, "the object of an obligation
must be something possible and not forbidden by law or good
morals". More generally, article 13 declares that "no one can
by private agreement, validly contravene the laws of public order
and good morals".' Is a piece of tissue or an organ "an object
of commerce", would its sale be "forbidden by law or good
morals" in Quebec?
There is to my knowledge no statute in Quebec that forbids
someone to sell his body or parts thereof. However, it is stated
by Mr. Faribault" that one cannot sell part of one's body for
surgical purposes, but can during his life dispose of his dead body
as "a future thing" . This statement seems to be based on the civil
law of France . In that country it is generally considered contrary
to good morals to dispose of one's life, health or body without a
proper motivation." However, in many countries including France
it is ethically and legally acceptable to sell blood.'' Of course,
should the sale of an organ be legal, nice problems of warranty
could occur if, for instance, the kidney transplant caused some
harm to the recipient. The French law," stipulates, that human
blood cannot be considered as a merchandise. From a public policy
point of view it would seem that in order to prevent a traffic in
organs or tissue, any remuneration for the donor should be pro-
hibited." It would be advisable, however, to provide some special
?s See also articles 984, 989, 990 of the Civil Code which deal with the
requirement that a contract must have a lawful cause or consideration .
"Traité de droit civil du Québec, vol. 11 (1961), No . 104, p. 144 . 10To
authorities are cited in support of this proposition. Cf. Dierkens, op. cit .,
footnote 15, p. 150 (the sale of a dead body is prohibited) .
" See for instance Planiol, Traité élémentaire de droit civil by Ripert
and Boulanger (4th ed., 1952), vol . 2, n. 111, p. 43 ; Josserand, La per-
sonne humaine dans le commerce juridique, D . H. 1932, Chronique 1 ;
Dierkens, op . cit ., ibid., p. 30 ; Savatier, Le droit de la personne et l'échelle
des valeurs, Hommage Gothot, p . 589 ; Lyon, 27 juin 1913, D. 1914, 2, 73,
note Lalou; Mazeaud, Leçons de droit civil, vol . 2 (1956), n. 236, p . 140,
n . 245, p . 196, ri. 280, p. 223 . Of course in France, as noted, supra, foot-
note 79, transplants from a living donor are not permitted .
" See Law of July 21st, 1952 incorporated into article 666 et seq. of
the Code of Public Health.
"Ibid. See also Savatier, De sanguine jus, Dalloz Chronique, XXIV,
1954, p . 141 .
"As to contracts illegal at common law on grounds of public policy
see Cheshire and Fifoot, The Law of Contract (6th ed., 1964), p . 296 et
seq. I was unable to find any case involving the sale of organs or parts of
the body in common law jurisdictions .
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insurance for the donor, should he become incapacitated as a re-
sult of the removal of the transplant or should he die. Such insur-
ance could cover his medical expenses as well as support for
himself and his family .
2. Problems Arising Out of the Use of Organs From Cadavers .
Cadavers are by far the most important source of transplants,
since very few organs or tissue may be given by a live donor with-
out endangering his health or his life.
As noted in Part I, organs such as kidneys and the liver must
be removed from the cadaver donor as soon after death as pos-
sible if irreversible damage to the organ is to be avoided. This
emphasizes the importance of an immediately available consent.
A very vexing problem confronting the hospital and the mem-
bers of the transplantation team is that of determining who may
give consent to remove the organs from a person who has just
died or whose death is imminent . In the absence of statutory
authority for a living authorized person to grant permission to
remove such organs immediately after death, must permission be
obtained from the executor or administrator, or from the next of
kin? Also, in the absence of statutory authority, may a living per-
son dispose of his body or part of his body after his death by will?
Is there a property right in a cadaver?" Even in States or Provinces
where there is such statutory authority, is the bequest binding on
the testator's executor, spouse or close relative? Would it be ap-
propriate to obtain the consent of the member of the family who
will have control of the cadaver after the death of the donor at
the same time as that of the donor himself? Does consent to per-
form an autopsy imply consent to the removal of tissue or organs?
More generally, should the present Human Tissue Acts and An-
atomy Acts in force in several Canadian Provinces be replaced
by a law that would simply state that a cadaver is available for
therapeutic or scientific use if the deceased did not express a con-
trary wish? Such a statute would take care of situations where it
is not possible to locate the spouse, executor or next of kin. Under
present rules, the only problem then remaining would be the de-
termination of the exact moment of death which as noted pre-
viously is essentially a medical problem.'
ai See Barish, Law of Testamentary Disposition-A Legal Barrier to
Medical Advance (1956), 30 Temp . L.Q . 40 .
as See supra, p. 350 . In England, for instance, there is a private mem-
ber's Bill (No. 101 . March 13th, 1968) to which the House of Commons is
shortly to give a second reading . It deals with renal transplants only and
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A. Common Law Rules.
In England as well as in other common law countries, it has
always been the law that the bodies of persons dying within the
jurisdiction should be decently buried . However, the persons on
whom the duty of disposal falls and the precise nature and scope
of this duty have never been authoritatively determined .
Most of the cases are concerned with the liability to pay
funeral expenses or with the liability for nuisance that arises from
an unburied body . These cases seem to indicate that the obligation
to bury the body of a deceased person lies on the executor or ad-
ministrator, on the husband- of a deceased wife and possibly on
the wife of a deceased husband; on the parent of a deceased child
and possibly on the child of a deceased parent ; on the occupier of
the premises on which the body is found or on the appropriate
local authority where no suitable arrangements are being made
otherwise.
From the point of view of transplantation where time is of the
essence, it is essential to quickly determine who is in a position
to authorize the removal of tissue and organs from a dead body .
Thus, the transplant team is not concerned with the _ question of
who should discharge the duty to bury or the question of liability
for the payment of the funeral expenses . What is of primary im-
portance is the problem of who, if anyone, is entitled to possession
of the body of the deceased . The basic principle of the common
law in this regard is that there can be no property in the dead body
of a human being." This rule is of ancient origin . In England,
from and after the time of the Norman Conquest and until the
nineteenth century, the right of possession and disposition of a
dead body was solely the subject of ecclesiastical cognizance . "The
Church took the body to itself."" Common law courts were power-
less respecting the body of a deceased person. The person having
charge of a body cannot be considered the owner of it ; he holds
it only as a trust for the benefit of those who may from family
states in s . 2 : "It shall be lawful to remove from the body of a human
person, duly certified as dead, ary kidney or kidneys required for medical
purposes unless there is reason to believe that the deceased during his life-
time had instructed otherwise ." (June 1968) .
83 Williams v. Williams (1882), 20 Ch.D, 659, at p . 663 . Foster v. Dodd
(1867), L.R . 3 Q.B . 67, per Byles, J ., at p . 77 : "A dead body by law be-
longs to no one, and is, therefore, under the protection of the public."
s4 See Jackson, The Law of Cadavers and of Burial Places (2nd ed.,
1950), p . 126 . For an historical survey see p . 125 et seq. In general, Polson,
Brittain, Marshall, The Disposal of the Dead (2nd ed., 1962) .
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relationship or friendship have an interest in it." At common law,
an heir has no property right in the body of his ancestor."
Conversely, a person cannot by will or otherwise dispose of his
body after death and any directions he may have given are not
binding upon his personal representatives or survivors." However,
when the common law courts began to take jurisdiction over
religious offences, they created a right of possession for the pur-
pose of burial . They held that although there is no property right
in a cadaver" the person who has the duty to dispose of the body
"See also Kuzenski, Property in Dead Bodies (1924), 9 Marq . L.
Rev. 17.
"Coke, Third Institute (Ed. 1817), Ch. 97, p. 203 ; 4 Blackstone, Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England (1765), 236; for a criticism of the rule
see Jackson, op. cit., footnote 84, p. 127 et seq. He points out that in the
United States of America, at common law, the courts have refused to treat
a dead body as property in a material or commercial sense. A dead body
is not part of the assets of the estate, it may not be subject of a gift mortis
causa. On the other hand the courts have recognized a right to possession
as a quasi property right in the nature of a trust (ibid., pp. 133-134) . This
interest in the dead body vests in the relatives or in the next of kin and
can be protected by an action at law.
"'Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd ed ., 1953), vol. 4, p. 4 citing
Williams v. Williams, supra, footnote 83, at p. 665. See also Schara Tzedeck
v. Royal Trust Co., [1953] 1 S.C.R . 31, [1952] 4 D.L.R. 529 (claim for
burial services) .
"For a Quebec case which analyses the civil law with respect to
property in dead bodies see Phillips v, Montreal General Hospital (1908),
33 Que. S.C. 483, 4 E.L.R . 477. Davidson J. points out that there is marked
sterility of discussion or even reference with respect to this subject in the
French books. However, under the civil law a person may during his life
dispose of his remains in whole or in part, so long as the disposition does
not offend against public policy or police regulations . Thus, he may will
his body to a school of anatomy. In the absence of personal directions, the
remains are the property of the family just as the body of an animal
(at pp . 488-489, S.C .) . Also Ducharme v. Notre Dame Hospital (1933),
71 Que. S.C. 377; Dierkens, op . cit ., footnote 15, p. 133 et seq. . and Cass .
3, 7. 1899, Pas. 1899, I, 318 (Belgium). Also cf. p. 158:
"Le droit sur le cadavre n'est pas un droit de propriété, mais un droit
extrapatrimonial qui trouve son principe dans les liens du sang et de
l'affectivité . Il ne revient pas à ceux qui succèdent in bona, mais à ceux
qui succèdent in personam defuncti, aux continuateurs de la personne. et ce
non jure successionis, sed jure sanguinis. Il leur appartient, même s'ils sont
exclus de la succession . Il s'agit d'une prérogative de la parenté."
In Miner v. C.P.R . (1910), 15 W.L.R . 161 varied in part 18 W.L.R .
476, 3 Alta L.R . 408 (C.A .) Beck J., after referring to the English rule
that there can be no property in a corpse, quoted the following passage
from Pettigrew v. Pettigrew (1904), 207 Pa 313, 64 L.R.A . 179: "But,
inasmuch as there is a legally recognized right of custody, control, and
disposition, the essential attribute of ownership, I apprehend that it
would be more accurate to say that the law recognizes property in a
corpse, but property subject to a trust, and limited in its rights to such
exercise as shall be in conformity with the duty out of which the rights
arise" and said : "I adopt this opinion and would express it thus : the law
recognizes property in a corpse, a property, of course, which is subject, on
the one hand, to the obligations, e.g ., of proper care and prima facie of de-
cent burial appropriate to its condition and the condition of the individual
in his lifetime . . . and to the restraints upon its voluntary or involuntary
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has the right to possess it until it is buried or otherwise disposed
of." In general, in the absence of testamentary disposition providing
otherwise, the right to the possession of a dead body for the pur-
poses of preservation and burial belongs to the surviving spouse,
children and next of kin." Where the. deceased person has made a
will naming one or more executors this right to possession would
appear to be vested in the executor or executors."
At common law, permission for the removal of organs or tissues
from the body of the deceased must be granted by the person or
persons who are lawfully in possession of the body for the pur
pose of burial . Since, as noted earlier, organs must be removed
immediately after death, it is often impossible to locate these
persons in time in order to obtain their authorization. Should re-
moval take place without such authorization, the members of the
transplantation team would be civilly and criminally responsible.
An action for damages will lie at common law for the negligent
handling of a cadaver or interference with its possession on the
basis of the mental distress without circumstances of aggravation
suffered by the spouse or the next of kin as a result of the wrongful.
act." No actual pecuniary damages need be alleged or proved .
disposal and use provided by law (e .g., the , existence of conditions authoriz-
ing its use for anatomical purpose) or arising out of the fact that the thing
in question is a corpse (e.g., no lien can attach : R. v . Fox and Ors (1841),
2 Q.B . 246, 114 E.R. 95, 13 Mews 354, a public exhibition contrary to
public decency is not permissible . . . ) ; and, on the other hand, the nature
and extent of the right or obligation of the person for the time being
claiming property (e.g ., an executor, a husband, wife, next of kin, medical
institute, etc.) ." See also R. v. Sharpe (1857), 26 L.J.M.C. 47, at p . 48,
per Erle J. Also Hume, Dead Bodies (1956-58), 2 Sydney L. Rev . 109 . In
the ITnited States of America the old English doctrine that the executor has
the right to the custody and possession of the dead until after burial does
not obtain. See Wasmuth and Stewart, op . cit ., footnote 15, p . 451 .ss Halsbury, op. cit ., ibid. For most practical purposes the right to
possession is equivalent to ownership, see for instance art : 2268 of the
Quebec Civil Code.so Edmonds v . Armstrong Funeral Home Ltd., [19301 3 . W.W.R. 649,
25 Alta L.R. 173, [19311 1 D.L.R. 676, citing Larson v. Chase (1891),
50 N.W . 238, 47 Minn. 307 .
"Hunter v. Hunter (1930), 65 O.L.R . 586 . The executor of a deceased
person was held to have the right to the possession of his body for the
purpose of burial. The widow's claim to possession was denied by the court.
In general see Jackson, op . cit., footnote 84, esp . pp . 41-55, 124-183 ." Prosser, op . cit ., footnote 18, pp . 41, 50-51, 349 and Torres v. State
of New York (1962), 34 Misc. 2d 488, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 1005 (autopsy and
unauthorized burial) ; Edmonds v . Armstrong Funeral .Home Ltd., supra,
footnote 90.
For a case involving an unauthorized post mortem examination see
Davidson v . Garrett (1899), 30 O.R . 653, 19 C.L.T. 279, 5 C.C.C.-200
(Ont . C.A .) and Phillips v . Montreal General Hospital, supra, footnote 88 ;
cf. Miner v. C.P.R ., supra, footnote 88 . In general see Jackson, op. cit .,
footnote 84, pp . 124-183, esp. p. 142 et seq. which contains an excellent
analysis of civil actions respecting cadavers .
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Thus, an unauthorized autopsy is an unlawful trespass on personal
rights and is capable of causing such a sense of outrage and of
mental suffering as to constitute the proper elements of compensa-
tory damages." Finally, according to section 167 of the Criminal
Code, "every one who (a) neglects, without lawful excuse, to per-
form any duty that is imposed upon him by law or that he under-
takes with reference to the burial of a dead human body or human
remains or (b) improperly or indecently interferes with or offers
any indignity to a dead body or human remains, whether buried
or not is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to im-
prisonment for five years"."
In Canada, statutory offences have also been created by such
Acts as the Anatomy Act," in relation to the removal of dead
bodies for the purpose and the practice thereon of anatomy.
93 Prosser op. cit., ibid.
94 See R. v. Newcomb (1898), 2 C.C.C. 255 (N.S.) . At common law
any person who without lawful authority disposes of a dead body for
dissecting purposes and for gain and profit is indictable : R. v. Gilles
(1818), Russel and Ryan 366n also R . v. Lynn (1788), 2 Term Reports
(Dunford and East) 733 . See also Hume, op. cit., footnote 88, at p. 127:
"At common law certain offences are recognised in relation to dead
bodies, the principal ones being:
(a) The person on whom the duty of burial falls is guilty of a misde-
meanour if, having the means, he fails to dispose of the body . R. v. Yann
(1851), 2 Den. 325.
(b) It is a misdemeanour to prevent the burial of a body by refusal to
deliver it to the executor or person lawfully entitled to possession of it or
to bury it otherwise than in accordance with the directions of such person
or to detain it as security for a debt owed by the deceased ; Williams v.
Williams (1882), 20 Ch.D . 659; R. v. Fox & Ors (1841), 2 Q.B . 246.
(c) It is a misdemeanour to dispose of the body so as to prevent the
holding of an inquest which the coroner is entitled to hold R. v. Stephenson
& Anor (1884), 13 Q.B.D . 331 ; R. v. Price (1884), 12 Q.B.D . 247; R. v.
Davis (1942), 42 S.R . (N.S.W.) 263.
(d) It is a misdemeanour to disinter a body without lawful authority ;
R, v. Lynn (1788), 2 Term Reports 733, 100 E.R. 391; Foster v. Dodd
(1867), L.R . 3 Q.B . 67, per Byles J., at p. 77 ; or for an undertaker to sell
for the purpose of dissection or otherwise a body entrusted to him for the
purpose of burial ; R. v. Feist (1858), Dears. & B. 590, 169 E.R. 1132, 27
L.J. (N.S.) 164; R. v. Sharpe (1858), Dears. & B. 160, 169 E.R . 959; R. v.
Cundick (1822), Dow. & Ry . N.P . 13 .
It is no defence to such a charge that there was no want of decency or
propriety or that the disinterment was for a pious or laudable motive. R. v.
Sharpe, supra.
(e) It is a misdemeanour to expose a body on or near a public high-
way where it may be seen by passers-by in such a way as to shock public
decency. R. v. Clark (1883), 15 Cox C.C . 171.
(f) It is no offence to burn a body provided
(i) the cremation is effected decently ;
(ü) there is no nuisance ;
(iii) there is no attempt to conceal the commission or impede the
prosecution of any offence or to prevent the holding of any
inquest. R. v. Stephenson & Anor (1884), 13 Q.B.D . 331;
R. v. Price (1884), 12 Q.B.D . 247."
95 In Ontario see R.S.O ., 1960, c. 14, s. 14, as am. by 1964, c. 2.
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Even in the absence of specific legislation authorizing testa-
mentary disposition of the donor's body, it is difficult to understand
why, in Canada today, a person may direct that his body be
cremated and may not direct that it be used for therapeutic pur-
poses or for the purpose of medical education or research notwith-
standing that the testator's spouse or close relative object."
"See also Barish, op . cit., footnote 81 . Note that in 1965 the Falconer
Foundation of New York recommended the printing of a card which con-
tains the following authorization :
This will certify that I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . do hereby express
my will and desire that after my demise my body shall be used for the
furtherance of medical science by the nearest medical school. My next of
kin and any other persons legally responsible for the disposal of my body
are individually and severally requested to respect and carry out my final
wishes that my body be delivered to said institution into the custody of the
Dean . In the absence of any specific instructions for the disposal of the
remains after use for scientific purposes is completed the Dean is authorized
to use his own discretion.
Given under my hand and seal
this . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . day of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
in the year of our Lord
Nineteen Sixty-
Signature: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .
Witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The purpose of this card is to alert anyone at the scene of an accident to
the desires of the deceased so that bodies intended for medical science
would not be inadvertently embalmed, thereby denying the wishes of the
deceased.
Wasmuth and Stewart suggest the following authorization for the re-
moval of organs from cadavers, op. cit., footnote 15, p. 471, to be signed
by the next of kin of the deceased :
Authorization to Remove Kidneys for Transplantation
I hereby authorize and direct the surgeons on the staff of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .
	
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hospital to remove, by an abdominalincision, the kidneys from the body of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
deceased. It is my wish that these kidneys, if suitable, be used for purposes
of transplantation, in order to attempt to preserve life, health, and well
being. . . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Signature
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Relationship to deceased
.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Address'
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.Witnesses .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Hospital for Sick Children of Toronto uses the following form:
CONSENT TO REMOVAL OF PARTS OF A BODY
FOR THERAPEUTIC OR OTHER PURPOSES
I, the undersigned, do hereby give my consent to the removal of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
for therapeutic or other purposes.
Parent or
Legal Guardian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Witness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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B . Disposal of a Dead Body in Accordance with the Anatomy
Acts of the Various Provinces.
In England, the Anatomy Act, 1832,97 deals with two distinct
sets of circumstances : First, the granting of permission for an
anatomical examination by the person lawfully in possession of
the body after death and second, with the case where a direction
is given by a testator for such examination. "An executor, or
other party having lawful possession of a dead body, and not being
an undertaker or other party entrusted for the purpose only of inter-
ment, may permit the body to be anatomically examined, unless
to the knowledge of that executor or other party, the deceased
stated in writing during his life, or verbally in the presence of two
or more witnesses during the illness of which he died, that he did
not wish his body to undergo examination or unless the surviving
husband or wife or any known relative of the deceased, requires
interment without examination.""
Section 8 of the Act also states that : "If the deceased at any
time during his life in writing or verbally in the presence of two
witnesses during the illness whereof he died shall direct an
anatomical examination to be made or nominates a person author-
ised by the Act to carry out such examination and such direction
or nomination comes to the knowledge of the person having law-
ful possession of the body that person shall direct in the one case
or request and permit in the other an anatomical examination
unless the surviving husband or wife or nearest known relative
or any one or more of such person's nearest known relatives
being of kin in the same degree require interment without such
examination." Consent to have the body anatomically examined
does not seem to imply consent to the removal of tissue or organs
for transplantation purposes."
The Anatomy Acts in force in the Provinces of Canada vary in
their contents . One of the most comprehensive Acts is that of
Manitoba . Section 5 of the Act provides that :. . .
97 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 75, as am . by 1871, c. 16, 1887, c. 52, 1961, c. 54.
"I S. 7, Halsbury, op . cit., footnote 87 (3rd ed., 1953), vol. 26, p. 23 .
'9 See s. 13 . After anatomical dissection the Act requires that such body
shall be decently interred . Retention of any part of it would be contrary to
the Act since the body cannot be claimed to have been buried if a part of
it is wilfully retained. This narrow interpretation has been rejected by Poi-
son, The Disposal of the Dead (1953), p. 29 .
""" The Anatomy Act, R.S.M ., 1954, c. 5, as am. by S.M., 1959, 2nd
Sess ., c. 5 . Preferred claimant means: "a husband, wife, parent, child,
brother, sister, grandparent, grandchild, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, first
cousin, step-father, step-mother, step-child, step-brother, step-sister, father-
in-law, mother-in-law, brother-in-law or sister-in-law of a deceased person
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5 . (1) The body of any person which remains unclaimed by a preferred
claimant, for a period of forty-eight hours after the death of
that person shall, at the expiration of that period, be under the
control of the inspector [of Anatomy] or of the sub-inspector of
the division or section within which death occurred.
(2) Any person who is a preferred claimant in respect of the body
of a dead person may at any time claim the body from the
inspector or a sub-inspector or an authorized person ; and, on
such a claim being made, the inspector or sub-inspector or the-
authorized person shall forthwith deliver the body to the pre-
ferred claimant .
Furthermore :
6. (1) Subject to this Act, any person who is a preferred claimant or
other relative or bona fide friend of the deceased, and no other
person, shall be entitled to claim the body of a dead person at
any time after it has come into the possession or under the con-
trol of the inspector or a sub-inspector.
(2) Subject to section 5, the inspector or sub-inspector may accept or
postpone such a claim .
(3) If the authorized person or a claimant is dissatisfied with the
order or ruling of the inspector or sub-inspector, he may within
two days from the date of the order or ruling, and after giving
to the inspector or sub-inspector notice of his intention so to do,
apply to a police magistrate for an order directing delivery of
the body to him ; . and the police magistrate, if he is satisfied
that the claim is justified, may, in his discretion, direct that the
body be delivered to the applicant, subject to such conditions
as the police magistrate may impose.
(4) Any person entitled to claim a body may, present to the inspec-
tor or sub-inspector a duly signed and witnessed waiver or re-




(5) A person claiming a body may make the claim personally or
through his duly authorized agent.
(6) A person who claims and receives a body under this section is
responsible for the proper interment thereof and shall pay, or
cause to be paid, the cost of that interment.
In 1959, subsections 4A, B, and C were added to section
6 to cover specific bequests of bodies for the purposes of anato-
mical or other scientific instruction or requirements ."'
named by the deceased as executor of his will, or a representative of Last
Post Fund incorporated under the Companies Act (Canada), and includes
any such kindred of the half-blood equally with those of the whole-blood ;"
(s . 2(e) ) .
Authorized person means :
"The University of Manitoba, or any other institution or duly qualified
medical practitioner, or person holding a valid and unexpired certificate
of registration under the Dental Association Act authorized to receive de-
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(4A) Notwithstanding anything in section 5, any person may, before
his death, consent in writing over his signature, and in a form
satisfactory to the inspector, to the use of his body after death
for the purposes mentioned in subsection (1) of section 7 and to
control thereof by the inspector for those purposes.
(413) If, before or after the death of a person to whom subsection (4A)
applies, the consent is approved and countersigned by a person
entitled to claim the body of the deceased and presented to the
inspector or a sub-inspector, the consent has the same effect as a
waiver presented under subsection (4) .
(4C) The death of the person entitled to claim the body after he has
approved and countersigned the consent but before the death of
the person in respect of whose body the consent is given, does
not invalidate the consent or the approval and countersignature
thereof.
According to section 7:
7. (1) Where the body of a dead person that is under the control of the
inspector or a sub-inspector remains unclaimed for a period of
twenty-four hours after coming under that control, the inspector
or sub-inspector shall, if so required, deliver the body to the
university for the purposes of anatomical or other scientific
instruction or requirements .
(2) Where such a body is not required by the university, the inspec-
tor or sub-inspector shall dispose of it
(a) by delivery thereof to another institution or to a duly
qualified medical practitioner, or registered dentist in ac-
cordance with, and as may be prescribed by, the regula-
tions ; or
(b) in such other manner as may be prescribed in the regula-
tions.
8 . (1) No person shall perform an autopsy or post mortem upon a
body to which subsection (1) of section 5 refers, unless autho-
rized in writing to do so by the coroner.
(2) Members of the staff and medical students and dental students
of the university, with the approval of the physician or patholo-
gist performing a medico-legal autopsy, may obtain therefrom
such material in the recent state as they require for anatomical
or other scientific instruction or requirements .
(3) Nothing in this Act abridges or curtails the powers or authority
of the coroner.
The Actprohibits the sale or purchase of, or traffic in the bodies
of dead persons."' When a person dies in a hospital or other institu-
tion notice of the death must be given to a preferred claimant."'
Also according to section 17 :
17 . (1) Where a body
(a) is that of a person who dies, or is found dead, in a -hospital
or other institution, or
.. . Ibid., s . 15. "' Ibid., s . 16 .
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(b) is under the charge or control of an undertaker, coroner,
physician, or other person,
if
(c) the body is not claimed immediately by a preferred claim-
ant, or
(d) the superintendent or other head of the hospital or insti-,
tution, or the person in charge or control of the body as
aforesaid, is of the opinion that the body will not be so
claimed,
the superintendent or other, head, or the person in such charge or con-
trol, shall immediately give notice of the death to the inspector, [of
Anatomy] . . . .
On receipt of the notice the inspector will give notice of the
death of the person to the university which has twenty-four hours
to decide whether or not the body is required for purposes of
anatomical or other scientific instruction or requirements .
In Ontario, the Anatomy Act"' provides that :
3 . (1) A body,
(a) of a person that is found publicly exposed or sent to a
morgue upon which a coroner after having viewed it deems
an inquest unnecessary ; or
(b) of a person who immediately before death was supported
in and by a public institution,
shall be placed immediately under the control of the local inspector
of anatomy.
(2) Unless the body is claimed by,
(a) a relative or bona fide friend ; or
(b) a county councillor, in the case of the body of a person
who immediately before death was supported in and by a
county home for the aged,
within twenty-four hours after being found or sent to a public
morgue or within twenty-four hours after the death where the death
took place in a public institution, the body shall be delivered by the
local inspector to a person qualified to receive unclaimed bodies
under section 5."1
5. The persons qualified to receive unclaimed bodies under this
Act are the teachers of anatomy or surgery in a school, and,
if there is a school in the locality where there is a body to be
delivered to persons so qualified, such school has the first
claim to the body.los
"I Supra, footnote 95.
Los See also ss 9 (duty of coroners) and 12 (duty of superintendent of
public institutions) .
'"For similar provisions see B.C . : R.S.B.C ., 1960, c. 9 ; Sask. : R.S .S.,
1965, c. 258, as am . by S.S ., 1967, c. 57 ; Quebec : R.S.Q., 1964, c . 250 ;
N.B . : S.N.B ., 1957, c . 4 ; N.S . : R.S.N.S ., 1954, c . 8, as am. by S.N.S . 1964,
c. 16, 1966, c . 17 . Cf. Alta Universities Act, S.A ., 1966, c. 105, ss 53 to 57,
as am . by S.A ., 1967, c. 37 which repealed s. 53 and amended s. 57 .
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In the provinces that have adopted Human Tissue Acts .. . the
bodies of donors"' that are not required for use by the hospital
for transplantation purposes shall be made available to the local
inspector of anatomy.
C. Post Mortem Examinations .
A post mortem examination of the body of a deceased person
for the purpose of determining the cause of death may only be
performed in certain circumstances .
(i) Official Post Mortem Examinations
In the various provinces of Canada there are statutory pro-
visions whereby the coroner in some instances may order a post
mortem examination of a dead person. For example, section 7 of
the Ontario Coroner's Act"' provides that :
7. (1) Every person who has reason to believe that a deceased person
died,






(b) by unfair means;
(c) during pregnancy or following pregnancy in circumstances
that might reasonably be attributable thereto;
(d) suddenly and unexpectedly ;
(e) from disease or sickness for which he was not treated by
a legally qualified medical practitioner ;
(f) from any cause other than disease; or
(g) under such circumstances as may require investigation,
shall immediately notify a coroner of the facts and circumstances
relating to the death.""
Where there is reason to believe that a person died in any
circumstances mentioned in section 7, the body of the deceased
lo' Analyzed, infra, see for instance Ontario Act, S.O ., 1962-63, c. 59,
as am. by S.O ., 1967, c. 38, s. 2(2) . N.B . : S.N.B ., 1964, c. 4, s. 2(2) ; N.S . :
S.N.S ., 1964, c. 5, s . 2(2) ; Alta : S.A ., 1967, c. 37, s . 4; Nfld : S. Nfld,
1966-67, No . 78, s. 5.
"'A person who in writing at any time or orally in the presence of at
least two witnesses during his last illness has requested that his body or a
specified part or parts thereof be used after his death for therapeutic pur-
poses or the purposes of medical educational research, Ontario Act, ibid.,
s . 1."I R.S.O ., 1960, c. 69, as am . by S.O., 1960, c. 12, 1961-62, c. 20, 1965,
c. 20, 1966, c. 27 .
"'In Quebec see Coroners' Act, R.S.O., 1964, c. 29, s. 20 and Civil
Code, art . 69 . As to notices given by the person in charge of a mental hos-
pital, prison, etc ., see ss 21, 22 .
1968] Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation 389
"shall not be embalmed or cremated and no chemical shall be
applied to it externally or internally and no alteration of any
kind shall be made to it until the coroner so directs"."'
Also, according to section 6(3) of the Ontario Human Tissue
Act"', an authority shall notbe given to use the body of a deceased
person, or to remove parts thereof for .therapeutic purposes or for
the purpose of medical education or research if the person em-
powered to give the authority has reason to believe that an inquest
may be required to be held on the body of the deceased."'
Where the coroner is informed that the dead body of a person
is lying within his jurisdiction and that there is reason to believe
that the person died in any of the circumstances mentioned in
section 7, or that that person died while in the custody of an
officer of a reformatory, industrial farm, jail or lockup or while
a ward of a training school"' or resident or an in-patient in a hos-
pital, institution or home as defined in the Act,... "he shall issue his
warrant to take possession of the body and shall view the body and
make such further investigation as is required to enable him to
determine whether or not an inquest is necessary","'
Where the coroner determines that an inquest is unnecessary,
he will issue his warrant to bury the body"' or his consent to its
use or to the use of parts of the body for therapeutic purposes or
for the purpose of medical education or research... or for anatomi-
cal examination. ..'
"IIbid., s . 8.
112 Supra, footnote 107.
119 See also Model Act, Human Tissue, s . 2(2) (c), 1965 Proceedings of
the Conference of Commissioners of Uniformity of Legislation in Canada
(herein after cited as Proceedings), p. 104 .
"IS. 22, supra, footnote 109. Quebec Act, s . 21, supra, footnote 110.",'Ibid., s. 21 .. . .Ibid., s . 10 . See also s . 21 : "The coroner shall investigate the cir-
cumstances of the death and, if as a result of the investigation he is of the
opinion that an inquest ought to be held, he shall issue his warrant and hold
an inquest upon the body ." S. 22 : "The coroner shall issue his warrant and
hold an inquest upon the body .". . . Ibid., s . 12(1) .. . . Model Act, supra, footnote 113, s . 2(2) (c) . Note that :
"13.Where the coroner determines that an inquest is necessary, he shall
issue his warrant for an inquest, and shall forthwith transmit to the Crown
Attorney and the supervising coroner a signed statement setting forth
briefly the result of the investigation and the grounds upon which he de-
termined that an inquest should be held."
11' See Quebec Coroners' Act, supra, footnote 110, ss 49, 52. In Ontario
the Anatomy Act, supra, footnote 95, also states :
"9 . .~,very coroner, whether he does or does not hold an inquest on a
body found publicly exposed, to which his attention has been called, and
which is not claimed in accordance with section 3, shall give notice to the
local inspector or, if there is none, he shall cause the body to be interred
at the expense of the municipality in which it was found."
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The coroner may order a post mortem examination as a sup-
plemental means to determine whether the person died in any
of the circumstances mentioned in section 7.
Section 23 states ;
23 . (1) A coroner may at any time during an investigation or inquest
issue his warrant for a post mortem examination on the body,
an analysis of the blood, urine, or the contents of the stomach
and intestines, or such other examination or analysis as the cir-
cumstances warrant.
(2) Where a coroner has determined that an inquest is unnecessary,
he shall not thereafter issue his warrant for a post mortem
examination or analysis without the consent in writing o£ the
Attorney-General, the Crown attorney or the supervising coro-
ner. 12o
The post mortem examination is within the discretion of the
coroner. Such examination must be made as soon after the death of
the deceased as is reasonably practicable . If a person dies in a
hospital the postmortem examination of the body of this person
will usually take place in that hospital. Although the person
making a post mortem must provide so far as possible for the
preservation of material which in his opinion bears upon the cause
of death, he cannot remove organs or tissue for the purpose of
transplantation without the consent of the person entitled to
possession of the body."'
Official post mortem examinations are carried out without the
consent of the surviving spouse or the next of kin. If the coroner
authorizes a post mortem wrongfully he may be held liable for
damages. In Davidson V. Garrett222 however, it has been held that a
Also Study of Anatomy Act, R.S.Q ., 1964, c. 250. S. 6 states : "Every
coroner, whether he does or does not hold an inquest on any body found
publicly exposed, shall also immediately notify the inspector or sub-inspector
of the finding thereof."
120 In Quebec, see ss 17 and 30, supra, footnote 110.
121 Note that in Quebec s. 4 of the Study of Anatomy Act, supra, foot-
note 106, provides that :
. When it is important that the cause of death should be clearly
and satisfactorily determined, the superintendent of any institution to which
this act applies may, in the case of the death of a patient supported by
such institution, order an autopsy on the body ; provided that nothing in this
clause shall receive an interpretation inconsistent with the provisions of this
act."
A post mortem may also be carried out under the provisions of hospital
charters in the case of death of a non-paying patient, see Meredith, op. cit.,
footnote 18, p. 160 and Ducharme v. Notre Dame Hospital, supra, foot-
note 88 .
122 Supra, footnote 92 . See also Religieuses HospitaWres de CHôtel Dieu
de Montréal v. Brouillette, [19431 Que. K.B. 441 (C.A .) which involved an
official post mortem in a case where the widow had refused her consent to
an unofficial post mortem on her husband's body.
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medical practitioner holding a post mortem examination which is
irregular, is not liable in trespass for his actions if they would
have been lawful had the coroner proceeded regularly . Actually,
for the advancement of medical science it would be advisable to
pass legislation allowing doctors in a restricted list of hospitals
to perform a post mortem immediately after death without the
consent of any of the relatives whenever scientific or therapeutic
interest warrants it.
(ii) Unofficial Post Mortem Examinations
The person who has the right to bury possesses the right to
allow a post mortem examination. In other words, a proper consent
is a prerequisite to an unofficial post mortem.
In the absence of special statutory provisions.. . and of specific
testamentary dispositions to that effect, the consent of the surviv-
ing spouse, if there is one, should be obtained unless the deceased
was legally separated at the time of death. The surviving spouse
has full authority over the body as against the next of kin'. ' When
the deceased left a will, it is advisable to obtain the consent of
the executor as well as that of the surviving spouse . When there
is no surviving spouse or if the parties were legally separated the
consent should be given by the next of kin."' Finally, in the case
of a minor or a mentally deficient person, depending upon the
circumstances, the parent, tutor, guardian or curator should give
the consent."'
i.3 See, infra, Human Tissue Acts .
x24 See-for instance Aetiza Life Ins. Co . v. Lindsay (1934), 69 F. 2d
627, at p . 630 .its In England the Human Tissue Act, 1961, c. 54, provides in s . 2(2)
that no post mortem examination which is not directed or requested by the
coroner or other competent legal authority shall be carried out without the
authority of the person in lawful possession of the body.its Wasmuth and Stewart suggest that consent to a postmortem exami-
nation may be obtained in any of the following ways, op. cit., footnote 15,
p. 459 :
"1) by written authorization signed by the deceased during his lifetime.
2) by written consent of any party whom the deceased during his life-
time designated by written instrument to take charge of his body for burial .
3) by consent of the decedent's surviving spouse.
4) When the surviving spouse is, incompetent, unavailable, or does not
claim the body for burial, or when there is no spouse, by consent of any
adult, child, parent, brother, or sister of the decedent. The consent of any
one of such persons shall be sufficient provided that such autopsy shall not
be performed under a consent given by one of such persons if, before such
autopsy is performed, any of said others shall object in writing to the
physician or the surgeon by whom the autopsy is to be performed.
5) When none of the above-named persons is available to claim the
body, then the consent of any other relative or friend who assumes custody
of the body for burial . Such ante mortem consent or post mortem consent
for an autopsy probably is effective evidence in the absence of statute ."
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In the absence of statutory authority, it would appear that a
document signed by the deceased to be carried in his wallet and
incorporated in his will which contains the following language :
"I consent to a post mortem examination of my dead body, in-
cluding the privilege of using any of its parts for the benefit of
mankind" is not binding.. . on the person lawfully in possession
of the body.
Usually permission to perform a post mortem examination
does not include permission for the removal of tissue or organs.
Thus, unless the persons whose consent is necessary specifically
authorize the removal and retention of such tissue or organs as
the hospital's physicians may consider advisable, there is no possi-
bility of using this material for transplantation.''
In the case of unauthorized post mortem examinations the
plaintiff is entitled to recover moral as well as material damages,"'
The basis of recovery is found in the personal right of the de
ceased's spouse or next of kin to bury the body . The right to the
possession of the body for the purpose of burial is a right to the
possession of the body intact .
In order to insure the possible removal of organs or tissue in
a postmortem examination, it would be advisable for the consent
form to contain a special provision to that effect,"'
' " ' See, supra, Common Law.
128 Note that there may be a contractual right of post mortem examina-
tion of a body by representatives of an insurance' company in order that
they may ascertain the cause of death in cases where that is important in
determining the company's liability, Jackson, op . cit., footnote 84, p. 174;
and Aetna Life Ins. Co . v. Lindsay, supra, footnote 124.
"s See Phillips v. Montreal General Hospital, supra, footnote 88 ; Ed-
monds v. Armstrong Funeral Home Ltd., supra, footnote 90 : cf . Ducharrne
v. Notre Dame Hospital, supra, footnote 88 ; Davidson v. Garrett, supra,
footnote 92 .
130Wasmuth and Stewart, op . cit., footnote 15, p. 471 reproduce an
autopsy permit used by the Cleveland Clinic Foundation . This permit is as
follows:
CLEVELAND CLINIC HOSPITAL
Cleveland, Ohio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I do hereby grant permission to the authorities of The Cleveland Clinic
Foundation of Cleveland to perform an autopsy on the body of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , a deceased patient, with the object of
ascertaining the direct and indirect causes of death, including such exami-
nation of thorax and abdomen, brain, spinal cord, peripheral nerves, bones
and marrow, neck, and organs of special senses, as may be necessary for
this purpose, and to remove and retain such parts of the body as -may be
deemed necessary for study subsequent to the autopsy.*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
to signature'
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Signed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1968] Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation 393
D. Disposal of a Dead Body and Parts Thereof in Accordance
with the Cornea Transplant Acts and Human Tissue Acts."'
In 1959 the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of
Relationship to patient
	
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Address . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hospital Superintendent
*When permission for examination is limited, draw a line through each part
for which permission for examination is not given.
In Toronto the Hospital for Sick Children uses the following consent to
post mortem :
THE HOSPITAL FOR SICK CHILDREN
I, the undersigned, do hereby give my consent to a Postmortem exami-
nation being held on the body of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I understand that I am to make arrangements for burial when the
examination has been completed.
PARENT OR
LEGAL GUARDIAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ADDRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
I also give consent for removal of the eyes, which will be placed in the
Canadian Eye Bank and used for the restoration of sight in another person.
PARENT OR
LEGAL GUARDIAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
WITNESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 . . . . . . . . . . . .
TIME SIGNED (Use 24-hour Clock) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Toronto General Hospital uses a substantially similar form:
The undersigned, as . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Capacity or Relationship)
of the late . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(name of deceased)
hereby consents to and authorizes a post mortem examination on the body
of the deceased, including the removal, use and disposal of any organs and
tissues in the discretion of the Hospital, subject to the following:
*SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND/OR RESERVATIONS, IF ANY
. . . . . . . . . . ~
Dated .the'




f. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ï9. . . . . . . . .i . .
WITNESS:




*IF EYES ARE TO BE REMOVED TO OBTAIN CORNEAL GRAFTS THIS SHOULD
_ BE STATED AS A SPECIAL INSTRUCTION.
The forms used by the Toronto Western Hospital and the New Mount
Sinai Hospital do not contain any reference to the removal of the eyes .
131 For a study of the legislation of some American States that permit
an individual to dispose of his body after death by will see Wasmuth and
Stewart, op. cit., ibid., p. 448 et seq.
About thirty-eight American States have in recent years adopted general
gift statutes dealing with transplantation . In addition four States have
statutes providing for the gift of eyes only . Most of these statutes differ in
their enumeration of permissible donees ; as to acceptable purposes of gifts,
the minimum age of the donor, the method of execution of the instruments
of gift, etc . In other words, the statutory picture is very confused, and a
Uniform Act is needed to correct this situation. See, infra, footnote 169.
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Legislation in Canada approved a Model Cornea Transplant Act. . .
which is in substance of the same effect as the English Corneal
Grafting Act, 1952 . 133 This Act provides that if any person either
in writing at any time or orally in the presence of at least two
witnesses during his last illness, has requested that his eyes be
used after his death for the purpose of improving or restoring the
sight of a living person, the administrative head of the hospital,
or the person acting in that capacity if the donor dies in a hospital
or if death takes place elsewhere, his spouse, or if none, any of his
children of full age or, if none, either of his parents, or if none, any
of his brothers or sisters or, if none, the person lawfully in posses-
sion of the body"' of the deceased person may authorize the re-
moval of the eyes from the body of the deceased person by a duly
qualified medical practitioner and their use for that purpose."'
Where the prospective donor has not made a request that his
eyes be used after his death for therapeutic purposes, his spouse, or
if none, any of his children of full age, or if none, either of his
parents, or if none, any of his brothers or sisters or, if none, the
person lawfully in possession of the body of the deceased person
may authorize the removal of the eyes for such purposes."'
An authority given in accordance with the foregoing provisions
is sufficient warrant for the removal of the eyes from the body for
the purposes specified."' The authority shall not be given if the
person empowered to give it has reason to believe that the person
who made the request subsequently withdrew it."'
Finally, authority for the removal of the eyes shall not be given
if the party empowered to give such authority has reason to believe
that an inquest may be required to be held on the body of the
deceased."'
The Act does not make unlawful any dealing with the body of
the deceased that would be lawful if it had not been passed ."'
This Uniform Model Act was adopted by eight of the nine
common law Provinces and by the two Territories. New Brunswick
did not adopt the Act as, in 1957, her legislature had passed a
Corneal Grafting Act based on the United Kingdom Act of 1952 . 141
1aa 1959 Proceedings 77 .
133 15 &16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz . 2, c. 28 . In France see Law of July 6th, 1949 .
134A person lawfully in possession of the body does not include a
coroner in possession of a body for the purpose of investigation or an
embalmer in possession of a body for the purpose of its burial, cremation
or other disposition. S . 2, Model Act, supra, footnote 132 .
135 See ss 3, 4 of the Model Act, ibid .
136 S . 5, Model Act, ibid. 13' S . 6, Model Act, ibid .136 S . 7, Model Act, ibid. 136 S . 8, Model Act, ibid .
110S. 9, Model Act, ibid. 141 S.N.B ., 1957 . c. 7 .
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In 1963 Ontario replaced its Cornea Transplant Act with a
Human Tissue Act.14' This is what had happened in England in
1961 when the Corneal Grafting Act was also replaced by the
Human Tissue Act."
In 1964 Nova Scotia" and New Brunswick" adopted Human
Tissue Acts based on the Ontario Act with some variations . The
Ontario Human Tissue Act extends the principles found in the
Model Cornea Transplant Act.
Firstly, The Ontario Act applies to any part or parts of the
body or the whole body and secondly, it deals with uses "for
therapeutic purposes or for the purposes of medical education or
research in accordance with the request of the donor"."
The Act does not change the common law rule that the de-
ceased's wishes are not legally binding upon his representatives or
survivors since in cases where the deceased had made a request
in the prescribed manned" that his body or a specified part or
parts thereof be used after his death for the purposes mentioned
above, a specified person may not authorize the use of the body or
the removal of the part or parts of the body and their use in
accordance with the request.
Where the donor dies in a hospital, its administrative head or
the person, acting in that capacity may not give such authorization
if he knows that any of the close relatives objects to the use of the
body or parts thereof. However, if the donor's whole body is . not
required by the hospital, the administrative head of the hospital
shall immediately notify the local inspector of anatomy who shall
then take control of the body."' In such a case it would seem that
the surviving relatives cannot object to the disposal of the body as
the word "shall" is used instead of "may".
It has been suggested that a possible interpretation of section
2(2) is that it is subject to section 2(l) . The head of the hospital
only has to notify the inspector of anatomy if he has authorized
the use of the body and he has no use for it ; if he has not authorized
the use, he does not have to notify the inspector of anatomy."
There is no equivalent provision in the English Act, and under
the Nova Scotia Act the inspector of anatomy "may" and not
"shall" take control of the body .
" R.S.O ., 1960, c. 68 and, supra, footnote 107.
143 Supra, footnote 125.
	
144 Supra, footnote 107.
145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., s . 2.
147 (i) In writing at any time or (ii) orally in the presence of at least
two witnesses during his last illness .
146 Supra, footnote 107, s. 2(2) .
149 1964 Proceedings, p. 65.
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Actually, why should it make any difference whether or not the
donor dies in or out of a hospital? It could be argued that when the
donor dies in a hospital the authorization should be given not only
by the head of the hospital but also alternatively by the person
who could have given it if the donor had died outside the
hospital."'
If authorization is deemed necessary at all, I would think that
in all cases the same persons should be entitled to give their autho-
rization . The reason why, in the case of a donor dying in a hospital,
the statute gives authority to the administrative head and not to
the relatives is probably a medical one.
In the case of transplants it is necessary to remove them as
soon as the donor dies . Time is of the essence. By giving authority
to the head of the hospital, the law wants to make sure that no
time will be wasted and that the transplantation operation will be
successful . On the other hand, if the hospital authorities have to
start looking for the relatives and, assuming that they can find
them within a reasonable period of time, obtain their authorization
when they are likely to be grieving, it is improbable that any
transplantation operation could be successfully performed.
When the donor dies in a place other than a hospital the person
who according to section 3, may give permission for the body or
any of the parts thereof to be used in accordance with the wishes
of the deceased, is "his spouse or, if none, any of his children of
full age or, if none, either of his parents or, if none, any of his
brothers or sisters or, if none, the person lawfully in possession of
his body".
Under this section it is possible for one relative to give the
authorization against the wishes of all the others . In order to avoid
the possibility of family feuds it would be better if the Act had
made the wishes of the deceased donor as binding as a will dis-
posing of his assets, subject only to considerations of need and
suitability. Effectiveness of the request should not depend on the
authorization of another person .
Nor would it seem to be advisable to replace the present rule
by one that would enable any relative to veto the use of the body
or parts thereof as in practice such a rule could easily defeat the
purpose of the Act.
An authority shall not be given under section 2 or 3 if the per-
son empowered to give the authority has reason to believe that
the person who made the request subsequently withdrew it .
150 Ibid., p. 66
1968] Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation 397
In sections 4, 4(a) and 6(2) and (3) the Act deals with
what may be done where the deceased has made no request and
there is no evidence that he would have objected . Whether the
donor dies in or outside a hospital "his spouse or, if none, any of
his children of full age, or, if none, either of his parents or, if none,
any of his brothers or sisters or, if none, the person lawfully in
possession of the body.. of the deceased person may authorize the
removal of any specified part or parts from the body of the de-
ceased person by a duly qualified medical practitioner and their use
for therapeutic purposes or for the purpose of medical education
or research"."' The Act does not authorize the use of the whole
body."' There is no logical or ethical reason why a distinction
should be made between the removal of part or parts of the body
and the use of the whole body.
As in the case where a specific request was made by the donor,
it is possible for one person to give an authorization despite the
objections of all other relatives ."' Perhaps in such a case, any close
relative or any member of a class of relatives should have the
power to veto the use of the body or of the removal of part or parts
thereof.
Finally, it should be noted that in 1967 the Ontario Legislature
added section 4a to the Act to cover the case of a patient "who has
not made a request to be a donor [and] is in the opinion of a duly
qualified medical practitioner, incapable of making such a request
and his death is imminent and inevitable" ."'
Provided there is no evidence that the deceased would have
objected,"' his relatives taken in the same order, as in the pre-
ceding section "may authorize the removal after death of any
specified part or parts from the body of the person by a duly
qualified medical practitioner and their use for therapeutic pur-
poses or for the purposes of medical education and research" .
Again, one must assume that this amendment is primarily con-
cerned with the unconscious victim of an accident whose life may
be artificially maintained by mechanical devices . In order to insure
151 A difficulty arises in determining who is in fact a person lawfully
in possession of the body within the meaning of the Act, see s . 1(b), ibid.
It could be argued that the class of persons who are in lawful possession
of the body is at least as wide as the class of persons who are under an
obligation to bury it.
152 S . 4 (italics mine), ibid.
153 See also New Brunswick and United Kingdom Acts, supra, footnotes
107 and 113. Cf. Nova Scotia Act which includes the whole body, supra,
footnote 107.
154Cf. United Kingdom Act, s. 1(2), ibid."'Supra, footnote 107 .
	
151 S. 6(2), ibid.
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the maximum success for the transplantation operation the Act
allows the necessary authorization to be obtained before actual
death."' This is a very progressive step and should be extremely
beneficial to recipients of transplants . This may also explain why
the section applies only to any specified part or parts of the body
and not to the whole body.
At the 1963 meeting of the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada, the Alberta Commissioners
were asked to make a study of the subject of the Human Tissue
Act and to submit a report at the next meeting of the Conference
with a draft Act if they considered it advisable."' At the 1964
meeting of the Conference, the Alberta Commissioners submitted
a report"' as a result of which the subject was referred back to
them for a further report and a draft Act embodying the following
principles :.. .
1 . When a deceased person has made a request for the use of his body
or parts of his body for therapeutic purposes for medical education
or research, if the deceased is apparently under the age of 21 he
cannot give a binding bequest of his whole body-only the parts
thereof, but in all other cases the request is binding, subject only to
considerations of need and suitability.
2. Where a deceased has not made such a request, the draft Act should
provide for the giving of authority with respect to the whole body
as well as parts by a close relative in a manner similar to that con-
tained in section 4 of the present Ontario Act with the exception that
an authorization for the use of the whole body is subject to a veto
by any one of the same class of relative.
In 1965 the Alberta Commissioners presented their report and
their draft Model Act.. . incorporating these principles . The Model
Act was referred back to them with a request that they prepare a
re-draft in accordance with the changes agreed upon at the annual
meeting. Copies of the revised draft were then distributed to the
Commissioners in their respective jurisdictions . As disapprovals by
two or more jurisdictions were not received by the Secretary of
the Conference by November 1965, the Act was formally adopted
by the Conference and recommended for enactment . " .2
At the end of 1967 the Act had been adopted by Alberta,"' the
North West Territories"' and Newfoundland ."'
"'From a medical point of view the ideal donor is the healthy victim
of an accident in a state of pre-agony and whose death is "foreseeable" .as 1963 Proceedings, p. 23 . a' 1964 Proceedings. p. 63.ao 1965 Proceedings, p. 63 . "1Ibid. ..2 1965 Proceedings, pp. 30, 104... . Supra, footnote 107. The Act also repeals and replaces the Corneal
Transplants Act, S.A ., 1960, c. 19 .. .. Human Tissue Ordinance, 1966, 2nd sess ., c . 9.
165 Supra, footnote 107.
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As will be noted the final version does 'not retain all of the
principles mentioned above.
The Model tact provides that :
1 . (1) A person eighteen years of age or over may,
(a) in writing at any time ; or
(b) orally in the presence of at least two witnesses during his
last illness,
direct that his body or any specified part or parts thereof be used
after his death for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of medical
education or for purposes of medical research .
(2) Upon the death of the person, the direction is binding and is full
authority for the use of the body or for the removal and use of
the specified part or parts thereof for the purposes specified
in the direction, except that a'person,
(a) shall not act upon a direction if he has reason to believe
that the person who gave the direction subsequently with-
drew it; and
(b) shall not, except with the consent of a coroner, act upon
a direction if he has reason to believe that an inquest may
be required to be held upon the body .
(3) A direction given by a person under eighteen years of age is
valid for the purposes of this section if the person who acted
upon it had no reason to believe that the person who gave the
direction was under eighteen years of age at the time he gave it .
This is an excellent provision since it enables minors close to
maturity to direct that their bodies be used for therapeutic pur-
poses or for the purpose of medical education or research. The
final draft did not embody the principles that a minor "cannot
give a binding bequest of his whole body". Persons over eighteen
years of age are given the same right as adults. Under that age
they cannot make a binding bequest at all. But more important
is the fact that such direction is binding on the executor and close
relatives . The direction does not depend upon a further authoriza-
tion following the death of the donor."' Thus, the wishes of the
deceased cannot be defeated.
The difficulty for a hospital is to find out whether the deceased
gave a direction, or whether he had withdrawn it . It would be ad-
visable for every person to carry a card stipulating that he has
given such a direction, or every voluntary donor could carry a
card containing the following information : name, address, age,
blood group (certified by a reputable laboratory), histo-com-
patibility, and the words voluntary donor followed by his signature
and that of two witnesses. This would solve the difficulties involved
in obtaining prior consent or in locating such a consent.
166Cf. Ontario Act,. supra, footnote 107, ss 2 and 3.
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According to section 2 :
2. (1) Where a person other than a person who has made a direction
under section 1 dies,
(a) his spouse ; or
(b) if none, any one of his children twenty-one years of age
or over; or
(c) if none, either of his parents; or
(d) if none, any one of his brothers or sisters twenty-one years
of age or over; or
(e) if none, the person lawfully in possession of the body, may
direct that the body or any specified part or parts thereof
may be used for therapeutic purposes or for purposes of
medical education or for purposes of medical research .
(2) The direction is full authority for the use of the body or for the
removal and the use of the specified part or parts thereof for
the purposes specified in the direction, except that a person,
(a) shall not act upon the direction if he has actual knowledge
that another member of the same class of persons as the
person who gave the direction objects thereto ; and
(b) shall not act upon the direction if he has reason to believe
that the deceased person would, if living, have objected
thereto; and
(c) shall not, except with the consent of a coroner, act upon
a direction if he has reason to believe that an inquest may
be required to be held upon the body.
(3) In this section, "person lawfully in possession of the body" does
not include
(a) a coroner in possession of a body for the purpose of in-
vestigation; or
(b) an embalmer or funeral director in possession of a body
for the purpose of its burial, cremation or other disposition .
The Act wisely removes the possibility of family strife since it
is not possible for one member of a class of relatives to give the
authorization against the wishes of all the others .
It must also be noted that the Model Act does not distinguish
between the use of parts and the use of the whole body except for
limited purposes,"' nor does it distinguish between the case where
the deceased died in a hospital and that where he died outside the
hospital except where there is no request for the donor's body.
Thus, section 3 provides that :
3. Where a direction has been given under section 1 or 2 for the use
of a deceased person's body for the purposes of medical research or
for purposes of medical education and at the time of the death there
is no request for the use of the body for either of those purposes,
(a) if the body is lying in a hospital the administrative head of the
hospital ; or
"7 See s. 3.
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(b) if . the body is lying elsewhere than .in the hospital, the person
lawfully in possession of the body
shall notify an inspector of anatomy who shall thereupon take con-
trol of the body and deliver it to a person qualified to receive un-
claimed bodies under The Anatomy Act for the purposes of that
Act . l ss
Finally, the Act states that it does not make unlawful any deal-
ing with the body of a deceased person or any part thereof that
would be lawful if the Act had not been passed.
Conclusion
The Model Act adopted by the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniformity of Legislation in Canada... and now in force in some
yes This section is to be omitted if the enacting Province has no medical
school. In other Provinces it may be necessary to vary the section to con-
form to the local anatomy legislation.
ses In the United States of America the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws has just prepared a second tentative
draft of a Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which will be presented for dis-
cussion at its seventy-seventh meeting to be held in Philadelphia on July
22nd, 1968 . Unless unforeseen difficulties arise, the draft as,revised in light
of discussions and suggestions received prior to and during the annual
meeting, will be presented before the end of the meeting to the Conference
for promulgation as a Uniform Act and for submission to the American
Bar Association and other appropriate professional organizations for ap-
proval. On promulgation by the Conference the Act will be available for
legislative adoption .
The Uniform Act is limited to ante mortem gifts . It does not attempt to
cover inter vivos gifts, post mortem autopsies or the delivery of unclaimed
bodies to medical schools .
In the Prefatory Note and Comments to the Second Tentative Draft
(1968), it is stated that the Act covers the following principal points (at
pp . 11-12)
"(1) Who may make an anatomical gift to take effect after death. The
gift may be made by the donor in his lifetime, assuming that he possesses
proper legal capacity ; also, if not made ante-mortem, it may be made by
the surviving relatives in a stated order of priority ; also certain other per-
sons are authorized . [S. 21 .
(2) To whom may a gift be made, and for what purposes . The gift may
run to a specific donee, or to any licensed hospital, teaching institution, or
physician ; and it may be made for teaching, research, therapy or trans-
plant . [S. 31 .
(3) How the gift is executed. The gift may be executed by a document
in writing, or, as in some states, by will ; the document must be signed and
witnessed by two persons ; provisions are made for a card, like an American
Express Card, to be carried on the donor's person to evidence the gift .
[S . 41 .
(4) Delivery of the document . Delivery is not . necessary to validity ; but
the will or other document or an attested copy thereof may, if desired by
the donor, be delivered to expedite the appropriate procedures without de-
lay immediately after death, or it may be filed in a local registry office if
one exists in the area . [S. 5) .
(5) Provisions for revocation . Provisions are made for revocation during
the life time of the donor, thus taking account of possible change of the
donor's desires . [S. 61 .
(6) Effect at and after death. The time of death is determined by the
402
	
LA REVUE DU BARREAU CANADIEN [VOL. XLVI
parts of Canada constitutes a great step forward as it recognizes
the binding effect of a direction by a deceased person that his body
or any specified part or parts thereof be used after his death for
transplantation purposes.
In the absence of such direction the Act allows the spouse,
children or next of kin to donate any of the decedent's organs
unless there is reason to believe that he would if living have ob
jected to the gift . This is not altogether satisfactory as in practice
express consent is very rare . In most cases the surgeon will have
to make reasonable inquiries of the spouse and the next of kin
before he can remove an organ. Since time is of the essence, often
the opportunity to perform a transplant operation will be lost.
For this reason Lord Kilbrandon"'° has proposed the following
type of legislation to replace the Act presently in existence in the
United Kingdom :
In any designated hospital it shall be lawful to remove from a dead
person any organ required for medical or scientific purposes unless the
hospital authorities have reason to believe that the deceased in his life-
time had forbidden this to be done provided that such removal shall not
disfigure the dead body.
This is certainly a step forward."' However, the part of this
proposal which deals with disfigurement could be omitted as it may
donor's attending physician . The gift is binding upon relatives . It is effec-
tive in any state . The donee may accept or reject the gift. If he accepts he
may proceed to remove parts given to him, and, if only parts are given,
after they are taken the body must be released to the relatives for burial.
Possible civil or criminal liability of the surgeon who uses the body or
removes the parts is precluded if he acts in good faith reliance upon the
evidence of the gift without notice of revocation. [S. 7] ."
It must be emphasized that the draft Model Act does not deal with the
time of death, it merely provides that "The time of death shall be deter-
mined by the physician who attends the donor at his death, or, if none, the
physician who certifies the death (s. 7(b))." Furthermore the deceased
donors physician must not be a participant in the procedures for removing
the part or iri transplanting it (ibid.) . The Act does not cover the question
of payment for gifts of body parts nor does it attempt to prescribe who
shall get the organs if there is a shortage of supply.
"'Ethics in Medical Progress (1966), p. 212 et seq. See also supra,
footnote 82 .
171To some extent Lord Kilbrandon's proposal changes the condition
precedent of consent to a condition subsequent of objection . See also the
proposal made by Sanders and Dukeminier, op . cit., footnote 4, at pp .
412-413, the surgeon "ought to be told `you can remove cadaver organs to
save the life of a living person unless the next of kin objects' . . . the
burden would be on the person who did not want the organs removed to
enter his objection . . . . We need precisely to reverse what presently is the
rule and what is the exception. The legal rule should favor removal of
cadaver organs and preservation of life ; the exception should permit
objection and decay" . Personally, I am not in favour of allowing the
spouse or the next of kin to object to the transplant . In fairness to the
authors it must be said that they have some doubt about the wisdom of
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constitute a psychological barrier for prospective donors by re-
minding them of possible .disfigurement. It could also open the
door to pointless litigation.
A major deficiency of the Model Act is that it does not refer
to donations of organs or tissue by live donors .
As pointed out by Lord Kilbrandon legislation should be
passed along these lines:"' "Any person . of full age and capacity
may consent, in writing, to any medical or surgical treatment
which is to be carried out in a designated hospital, provided that
the risks attendant thereon are not excessive and notwithstanding
that the treatment is not being carried out for the benefit of the
person himself." And he added:"'
(I would not include prisoners as being of full age and capacity, since
they are under restraint .) This is needed to get over the law as it prob-
ably stands at the moment. The law at the moment considers that the
procedure which the surgeon adopts is so severe- that it is incapable of
being consented to by the person being operated on unless that opera-
tion is for the person's own benefit . If that is not the law at the moment
many people think it is, and we still need something like my suggestion
for the purpose of declaring what the law is .
This rough draft leaves right out of consideration the mechanics of
explanation to the person upon whom the operation is going to be
done. This point is extremely 'important and will need very careful
elucidation . It will probably be necessary for some professional official
panel to be set up to say which procedures are justifiable, having regard
giving the next of kin the right to object, but have included the principle
in their proposal so as to obviate any constitutional problem regarding
freedom' of religion.
It has also been suggested by Professor Daube in Transplantation :
Acceptability of Procedures and the Required Legal Sanctions in Ethics
in Medical Progress (1966), p . 188, at pp. 192-193 that : "One could now
aim at legislation which would make available a corpse for therapeutic or
scientific use, if the deceased expressed a wish, not revoked, in this direc-
tion or, in the absence of such a disposition, if he did not express a con-
trary wish, if he did not belong to a group normally opposed to such avail-
ability, and if his next of kin does not immediately express a contrary
wish. So long as there were no reasons for assuming the existence of any
of these impediments, the use of the corpse would be permissible. Note
that I place a scientific, experimental object on the same level as a dis-
tinctly therapeutic one-this by contrast, you will find, with transplantation
from a living donor .
I think such legislation could be achieved, and it would give the medical
profession all it wants . The question was put to me: suppose there are no
other impediments but the next of kin is not known or not immediately
available, yet instant use of, say the deceased's kidneys is essential? In this
case, my law would concede their use . Every general regulation, alas, is a
compromise, and the next of kin's protection cannot be absolute ." Note
that the Model Act, supra, footnote 113, substantially embodies this pro-
posal . In general see Grad, Legislative Responses to the New Biology :
Limits and Possibilities (1968), 15 U.C.L.A . L. Rev. 480, esp. at pp. 496-
501 .
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to the risk which is going to be run. This is to cut out wild experimental
surgery, which I don't think the public would permit .
It is absolutely essential to make sure that the donor's consent
is free from any pressure . Also, in the case of a live donor, the
organ donated should be taken for therapeutical purposes only and
not for the purposes of medical education, research or experi-
mentation."
With respect to minors (as live donors), it is my belief that
they should not be authorized to donate organs until they are close
to maturity . Nor should the parents be allowed to consent to the
removal of healthy organs from their children before they are
dead .
Finally, some system of registration of potential cadaver donors
should be organized on a national basis .
Today, there have been enough experimental transplants from
one animal to another to enable surgeons to know most of the
technical aspects involved . Similarly, the immunological techniques
are fairly well understood . The question of the moment of death
of the donor can be solved by adequate tests . It should not be
merely a legal matter . The fear of modifying the personality of the
receiver by the transplantation operation is unfounded . As Dr.
Blaiberg can testify, a person's mind, spirit, personality, thought,
sensibility, and his vision of the world is not affected . The heart
performs a purely mechanical function. There is less likelihood of
changing the personality of a patient as a result of a heart trans-
plantation than by applying certain techniques of psychoanalysis or
neuro-surgery to mentally disturbed people .
Of course, accidents are possible . There could be a temporary
stoppage of the heart. There is also the difficulty of finding a suit-
able donor. it is not as easy to find a heart as it is to find a kidney
nor is it easy to maintain the recipient alive until the right heart
is found. The main problem is to decide whether or not to operate.
Such a decision should be made by a group of specialists and not
by one person alone.
Basically, the difficulties are more technical and ethical than
legal. The objectives of any modern legislation in the field of
homotransplantation should be to prevent possible abuses with
respect to the consent of live donors and at the same time facilitate
the work of the transplantation team by devising rules that will
enable the surgeons to operate as soon as a donor, dead or alive,
becomes available .
174 For my proposals in the case of live donors see supra, p. 374.
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Clearly, the predominant motivation of serious medical re-
search and experimentation should not be the enhancement of
national or personal prestige . However, from a moral point .of
view the difficult choice is to weigh the advancement of knowledge
for the benefit of all mankind against the health and welfare of
the individual donor and recipient.
